















This project was supported by grant no. 2007-IJ-CX-0008, awarded by the National Institute
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this
document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Project Supported by the National Institute of Justice
Executive Summary.......1
Introduction.......4
Part 1. Homegrown Terrorism: Rhetoric and Reality.... ..6
Part 2. Muslim-Americans’ Anti-Radicalization Activities.....18




Appendix: Muslim-American Terrorism Offenders, 2001-2009.....53
Sidebars
Research Site Profiles.....12-16
North Carolina Terrorism Arrests.....17-18
“I Called the FBI”.....23-24
“Venting Sessions”..........26
“We Monitor Our Masjids”..........27
“What Will Harm Them, Will Harm Us”..........35
“We Are Not Against America”..........36
Charts
Age.....     10
Citizenship Status....     .11





PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT
In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11,
2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere
around the world, a key counterterrorism concern
is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in
the United States. Yet, the record over the past
eight years contains relatively few examples of
Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned
toward violent extremism. This project seeks to ex-
plain this encouraging result by identifying charac-
teristics and practices in the Muslim-American com-
munity that are preventing radicalization and vio-
lence. 
This objective was pursued through interviews of
over 120 Muslims located in four different Muslim-
American communities across the country (Buffalo,
Houston, Seattle, and Raleigh-Durham), a comprehensive
review of studies and literature on Muslim-American
communities, a review of websites and publications of
Muslim-American organizations, and a compilation of
data on prosecutions of Muslim-Americans on violent
terrorism-related offenses. 
A review of these materials has led to recommen-
dations on how the positive anti-terrorism lessons of
Muslim-American communities can be reinforced. 
FINDINGS
This research resulted in a number of related find-
ings:
Increased Anti-Muslim Bias. Since 9/11, there has
been increased tension among Muslim-Americans
about their acceptance in mainstream American society.
Muslim-Americans perceive a stronger anti-Muslim bias
from both their day-to-day interactions and the media,
a bias that is confirmed in public opinion polling. While
Muslim-Americans understand and support the need
for enhanced security and counterterrorism initiatives,
they believe that some of these efforts are discriminatory,
and they are angered that innocent Muslim-Americans
bear the brunt of the impact of these policies. 
Low Numbers of Radicalized Muslim-Americans.
Although the vast majority of Muslim-Americans reject
radical extremist ideology and violence, a small number
of Muslim-Americans have radicalized since 9/11. In
the eight years following 9/11, according to our project’s
count, 139 Muslim-Americans committed acts of ter-
rorism-related violence or were prosecuted for terror-
ism-related offenses that involve some element of vio-
lence.  This level of approximately 17 individuals per
years is small compared to other violent crime in Amer-
ican, but not insignificant.  Homegrown terrorism is a
serious, but limited, problem. 
Practices of Muslim-American Communities Prevent
Radicalization. Our research shows that a variety of
practices of Muslim-American communities may be
helping to prevent and address instances of radicalization.
These practices include the following:
• Public and private denunciations of terrorism
and violence. Muslim-American organizations and
leaders have consistently condemned terrorist vio-
lence here and abroad since 9/11, arguing that
such violence is strictly condemned by Islam. Our
research found that these statements were not
just for public consumption, but were supported
by local Muslim religious and community leaders,
who consistently condemned political violence in
public sermons and private conversations. These
statements represent powerful messages that res-
onate within Muslim-American communities.
• Self-policing. Muslim-Americans have adopted
numerous internal self-policing practices to prevent
the growth of radical ideology in their communities.
The practices range from confronting individuals
who express radical ideology or support for terrorism,
preventing extremist ideologues from preaching in
mosques, communicating concerns about radical
individuals to law enforcement officials, and purging
radical extremists from membership in local mosques.
Muslim-Americans have also adopted programs
for youth to help identify individuals who react in-
appropriately to controversial issues so they can
be counseled and educated. 
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• Community-building. The creation of robust Mus-
lim-American communities may serve as a preven-
tative measure against radicalization by reducing
social isolation of individuals who may be at risk of
becoming radicalized. The stronger such commu-
nities are, in terms of social networks, educational
programs, and provision of social services, the
more likely they are to identify individuals who are
prone to radicalization and intervene appropriately.
Undermining radicalization is frequently not the
primary goal of these community-building activities,
which are generally aimed at strengthening com-
munity resources in response to the increased
social and governmental pressure that Muslim-
Americans have experienced since 9/11. However,
our research indicates that these activities may
have the positive side effect of reducing the
likelihood of radicalization. 
• Political engagement. Heightened political activity
of Muslim-Americans since 9/11 is also a positive
development for preventing radicalization. Political
engagement channels grievances into democratic
forums and promotes integration of Muslim-Amer-
icans into an important aspect of American life. At
the national level, Muslim-Americans are following
the example of other American minority groups by
creating advocacy organizations to express their
political goals. At the local level, community leaders
work through political avenues to pursue community
interests. These activities demonstrate to Muslims
in the United States and around the world that
Muslims are able to participate in the full range of
American life and that their grievances can be ef-
fectively addressed through peaceful means. Like
community-building, increased participation in
democratic politics did not occur for the purpose
of preventing radicalization, but it too may have
had the same positive side effect. 
• Identity politics. The expression of a Muslim-
American identity has taken on an increasingly as-
sertive tone in the years since 9/11. While some
observers are concerned that heightened expressions
of piety may be a sign of impending radicalization,
our research suggests otherwise. The assertion of
Muslim-American identity follows the precedent
of other racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the
United States: they have embraced the compatibility
of minority and American identities. Increased piety
among Muslim-Americans also serves to undercut
the radical message that American values and
practices are hostile to Islam.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Research findings suggest that radicalization in the
United States can be minimized by taking the fol-
lowing steps to reinforce successful anti-radicalization
activities of Muslim-American communities and
create a more positive environment for Muslim-
Americans:
1. Encourage Political Mobilization. Increased po-
litical mobilization is the most important trend identified
by this study, as it both stunts domestic radicalization
and provides an example to Muslims around the world
that grievances can be resolved through peaceful dem-
ocratic means. We recommend that policymakers in
the major political parties embrace this mobilization by
including Muslim-Americans in their outreach efforts
and by organizing them to gain their support, as they
do with other ethnic and religious groups.  Similarly,
public officials should attend events at mosques, as
they do at churches and synagogues. Muslim-American
groups should also be fully included in American political
dialogue. 
2. Promote Public Denunciations of Violence.
Denunciations of terrorism and violence are an important
reflection of Muslim-American opinion and values. The
Muslim-American community should disseminate these
statements widely. Public officials should reference these
statements whenever possible and the media should
include them in their coverage of terrorism and security
issues.
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3. Reinforce Self-Policing by Improving the Rela-
tionship Between Law Enforcement and Muslim-
American Communities. Muslim-American communities
are taking a variety of measures to prevent radicalization.
While there have been important achievements in
building a cooperative, trusting relationship between
Muslim-Americans and law enforcement, there have
also been tensions due to controversial law enforcement
techniques, lack of communication, and breakdowns
in trust. Muslim-American communities and law en-
forcement agencies must make efforts to cooperate
more closely to overcome mutual suspicions and achieve
common goals. An important element of increased
cooperation would be to initiate a candid dialogue be-
tween law enforcement and Muslim-American com-
munities about the handling of criminal cases and the
use of informants. Law enforcement agencies should
develop policies on the appropriate use of informants
in Muslim-American communities and discuss these
policies openly with community leaders. Muslim-Amer-
icans, for their part, should understand that the use of
informants is an accepted, long-standing law enforce-
ment practice and may be necessary in appropriate
cases to gather evidence on individuals who are a po-
tential danger. In addition to addressing grievances
about law enforcement tactics and operations, the re-
lationship could be strengthened and solidified by
hiring more Muslim law enforcement officers, increasing
outreach to non-religious entry points to the community,
and expanding the FBI’s Bridges Program and Citizen’s
Academy. 
4. Assist Community-Building Efforts. Strong com-
munities can provide education to Muslims who may
be uninformed about Islamic opposition to terrorism,
provide guidance and positive experiences for youth,
and identify individuals at risk of radicalization. We rec-
ommend that all levels of government make additional
efforts to provide community-building resources such
as youth centers, childcare facilities, public health clinics,
and English as a Second Language courses in disad-
vantaged Muslim-American communities. These re-
sources are especially important in isolated immigrant
communities. 
5. Promote Outreach by Social Service Agencies.
Our research suggests that Muslim-American commu-
nities desire collaboration and outreach with the gov-
ernment beyond law enforcement, in areas such as
public health, education, and transportation. Moving
toward this type of engagement acknowledges that
Muslim-American communities have needs and concerns
other than contributing to the nation’s counterterrorism
efforts.
6. Support Enhanced Religious Literacy. This re-
search reinforces the generally accepted observation
that Muslim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious
training are far less likely to radicalize than those
without such training. Since it would be inappropriate
for government to play a role in this area, the Muslim-
American community should invest in developing sem-
inaries, leadership programs, and on-line educational
courses. Foundations and universities should assist in
these efforts. 
7. Increase Civil Rights Enforcement. Enhanced
civil rights enforcement will contribute toward addressing
Muslim-American concerns about increased discrimi-
nation since September 11, 2001.
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In his speech at Cairo University, President Obama
proclaimed, “Islam has always been a part of Amer-
ica’s story.”1 He noted that Muslim-Americans have
“fought in our wars, they have served in our gov-
ernment, they have stood for civil rights, they
have started businesses, they have taught at our
universities, they’ve excelled in our sports arenas,
they’ve won Nobel Prizes, built our tallest building,
and lit the Olympic Torch.” Underneath links to
the text of this speech, on the White House website,
was a short video about three Muslim-Americans
serving in the United States government. One of
them, Afeefa Syeed, who moved to the United
States as a young girl and now serves in the State
Department, explained that she found “no contra-
diction between being a Muslim and being an
American. ... [T]he comfort zone that I have is here
in America, because of the simple seamless con-
nection between the two identities that forge into
one.”2
In contrast, two weeks earlier, the nation focused
on the foiled terrorist plot of four men from Newburgh,
New York, who are accused of attempting to bomb
two synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military
aircraft with surface-to-air missiles. The four were de-
scribed by authorities as Muslim converts. According
to the criminal complaint, each said he was willing to
engage in “jihad,” and one of the plotters justified his
action by saying that the military is “killing Muslim
brothers and sisters in Muslim countries, so if we kill
them here with I.E.D.s and stingers, it is equal.”3
Massive media coverage of the arrests amplified what
New York Police Department Commissioner Raymond
Kelly described as “our concern about homegrown ter-
rorism.”4
These two divergent examples of Muslim-Ameri-
cans—the comfortably assimilated federal employee
and the radicalized, anti-American jihadist—have dom-
inated the national discourse about Muslim-Americans
since 9/11, a discourse that has amplified since a spate
of arrests and incidents involving Muslim-Americans in
2009, most notably, the shooting spree by Nidal Hasan
at Fort Hood that killed 13 people and seriously
wounded dozens more. 
Despite the massive publicity that accompanies any
instance of “homegrown terrorism,” it is widely ac-
knowledged that the vast majority of Muslim-Americans
are ordinary, hard-working citizens and legal immigrants
who make up part of the American cultural tapestry
while practicing their minority faith. At the same time,
there are a small number of Muslim-Americans who
have adopted extremist radical ideologies and engaged
in illegal, and sometimes violent, conduct to advance
those views.
Most research about Muslim-Americans since 9/11
has tried to explain what might prompt an individual
enjoying all the advantages of living in the United
States to adopt a radical, violent ideology.5 Other
research has examined governmental efforts to gain
the assistance of Muslim-American communities in iden-
tifying potential terrorists and thwarting terrorist plots.6
Introduction




This project addresses the topic from a different
perspective. Instead of analyzing what has happened
to the few Muslim-Americans who have radicalized
and broken the law, we examine why so few Muslim-
Americans have followed the path of radicalization
and violence. Instead of trying to assess the effectiveness
of the government’s outreach efforts in Muslim-
American communities as a means of preventing ter-
rorism, this project examines what Muslim-Americans
communities are doing themselves to prevent radical-
ization and acts of violence. The goal of the project is
to learn how Muslim-American communities have been
dealing with the threat—to themselves as well as the
broader American community—posed by extremist
ideologies. These insights provide the basis for recom-
mendations about additional steps government agencies
and Muslim communities should take to meet the
threat of domestic terrorism.
In place of speculation, this project has generated
social-science evidence about how and why Muslim-
American communities have resisted radicalization and
political violence. Why have there been relatively few
examples of Muslim-Americans who have engaged in
terrorist activity? What characteristics of Muslim-American
communities have enabled them to counter the radical
message that is being transmitted across the globe?
What policies should be adopted to reinforce Muslim-
American communities’ successes? What can Muslim-
American communities do to reinforce and extend
these successes?
Our research focused on Muslim-Americans in four
communities: Seattle, Houston, Buffalo, and
Raleigh/Durham (see “Research Site Profiles,” begin-
ning page 12). These communities were chosen because
they are moderate sized and have not been subject to
prior research efforts. Members of our research team
lived in each of these communities for two- to three-
month periods and conducted more than 120 in-
depth interviews with community leaders and other
Muslim-Americans. Interviews probed how individuals,
parents, and community organizations, including
religious organizations, have dealt with the challenge
of Islamic radicalism. Interviewees were asked about
the steps their communities have taken to prevent
radicalization and their views on governmental outreach
efforts and counterterrorism policies. In addition to
these interviews, data has also been drawn from an
extensive review of Muslim-American publications and
websites of major Muslim-American organizations.
We believe this collective research yields anti-terror
lessons critical to the success of our national countert-
errorism effort. Up to now, law enforcement efforts
have effectively stymied most of the small number of
homegrown terrorists that have planned or attempted
to execute attacks in United States. Our national goal,
however, must be to ensure that even fewer individuals
head down the path of radicalization and political vio-
lence. Understanding the factors within Muslim-
American communities that are effectively stunting the
growth of radicalization within the United States will
be the key to achieving this important objective. 
Our national goal ... must be to ensure that 
even fewer individuals head down the path of 
radicalization and political violence
1. THE MUSLIM-
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE SINCE 9/11 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a national
trauma for the United States, and they were
especially traumatic for Muslim-Americans. Mus-
lim-Americans were subjected to the same fears as
other citizens regarding personal security and po-
tential future attacks, and their lives as Muslim-
Americans became severely complicated because
the perpetrators identified themselves as Muslims. 
One form of backlash against Muslim-Americans
expressed itself as social pressure, including hate crimes
and widespread suspicion by other Americans. Hate-
crimes against Muslims rose from 28 in 2000 to 481
recorded incidents in 2001, and current levels remain
about five times higher than prior to 9/11.7 A poll five
years after 9/11 found that 39 percent of Americans
believed that Muslims living in the United States were
not loyal to the United States, 34 percent believed that
they were sympathetic to al-Qaida, and 44 percent re-
ported that Muslim-Americans were “too extreme in
religious beliefs.”8
To address the fears Muslim-Americans were expe-
riencing, President Bush visited the Islamic Center of
Washington, D.C., six days after the attacks. In his
statements at the mosque, President Bush acknowledged
these fears and noted the difficulties faced by women
who exercised their religious freedom to wear a
headscarf or other covering: “I’ve been told that some
fear to leave [their homes]; some don’t want to go
shopping for their families; some don’t want to go
about their ordinary daily routines because, by wearing
cover, they’re afraid they’ll be intimidated. That should
not and that will not stand in America.”9 Bush com-
mented that those who “take out their anger” against
“our fellow citizens ... represent the worst of humankind
... and they should be ashamed of that kind of
behavior.”9  Throughout his presidency, Bush made a
point of visiting mosques and commemorating the
contributions of Muslim-Americas with the nation.10
Iftaar dinner has become an annual tradition at the
White House. 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Congress
also expressed its support by enacting a resolution
that condemned acts of violence and discrimination
against Arab-, South Asian-, and Muslim-American
communities, noting that they “are a vital part of the
Nation.”11
Law enforcement officials also made substantial
efforts to reach out to the Muslim-Americans after
9/11. In June, 2002, FBI Director Robert Mueller spoke
before the Muslim-American Council (AMC), despite
protests by some commentators that the AMC had
links with terrorist organizations.12 Mueller said: 
I am here because we must all be in this
war against terrorism together and because
a sound and trusting relationship with the
Muslim community can only bear the fruit
of a safer nation for us all. I appreciate the
help and support many in the Muslim-Amer-
Part 1.
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ican communities have already given us,
especially over the past nine months, and I
call on you, as Americans, to continue work-
ing with us to defeat terror.13
Mueller added that Muslim-Americans had cooper-
ated with investigations, provided information, partici-
pated in community meetings with FBI agents, and
even volunteered to quit their jobs to become translators
for the FBI.14
A second form of backlash involved government
anti-terrorism programs that had a severe impact on-
Muslim-American communities, including:
• The FBI investigation of the 9/11 attacks  resulted
in the detention of at least 1200, mostly Muslim,
citizens and aliens based on FBI investigative leads
and “anonymous tips called in by members of the
public suspicious of Arab and Muslim neighbors
who kept odd schedules”;15 
• The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS), required registration, fingerprinting, and
photographing of approximately 84,000 aliens from
25 Muslim and Arab countries;16
• Two Justice Department initiatives to interview
8,000 young Middle Eastern men for information
relating to terrorism;17
• A secret program to conduct radiation monitoring
at hundreds of mosques and other prominent
Muslim sites in five cities; and18
• The closing of seven U.S.-based Muslim charities
and the raiding of six others.19
These programs have resulted in thousands of de-
tentions and deportations, hundreds of arrests, but
only a handful of prosecutions on non-violent charges.
At the same time, these policies have generated con-
siderable fear among Muslim-Americans that they are
being singled out for heightened scrutiny, and that
their innocent conduct could be improperly construed
as support for terrorist activities. While this was not the
intended effect of the government’s policies, it is nec-
essary to acknowledge that these fears are deeply felt
among many Muslim-Americans. In the words of soci-
ologist Louise Cainkar, who conducted hundreds of in-
terviews in the Chicago area, Muslim-Americans suffer
from a very real sense of “homeland insecurity.”21 En-
gaging Muslim-Americans in future counterterrorism
efforts must take this background into account.
In the words of sociologist Louise Cainkar 




In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America per-
ceived the terrorist threat as having three potential
sources: 1) al-Qaida or other extremist groups
located abroad, 2) sleeper cells of al-Qaida members
living secretly inside the United States, and 3) indi-
viduals living inside the United States who might
radicalize and initiate attacks, either on their own
or at the direction of foreign groups.
Concerns about the third source, so-called “home-
grown terrorism,” have been prevalent since 9/11, but
the concerns have grown in relation to the other cate-
gories as time has passed without any additional large-
scale attacks inside the United States. The public’s fear
of homegrown terrorism became especially acute after
the July 2005 bombings in London, perpetrated by
Muslims born in the United Kingdom. Many in the
United States applied the logic that if young men born
in a free and open society like the United Kingdom
could be inspired by radical ideology to commit terrorism
against their fellow citizens, then the same could
happen here.
Similarly, some public officials have made statements
identifying homegrown terrorism as a high level security
threat. In a speech in 2006, FBI Director Robert Mueller
claimed, “Today, terrorist threats may come from smaller,
more loosely-defined individuals and cells who are not
affiliated with al-Qaida, but who are inspired by a
violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists
may prove to be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaida,
if not more so.”22 Later that year, Mueller noted,
“Among this world of threats, the prevention of another
terrorist attack is our number one priority. We are par-
ticularly concerned about the threat of homegrown
terrorist cells.”23 He estimated that the FBI was inves-
tigating “certainly hundreds” of people within the
country.24
Members of Congress also identified homegrown
terrorism as a dangerous and growing concern. Repre-
sentative Jane Harman commented, “Domestic radi-
calization that leads to violence in the American home-
land is one of the greatest emerging threats to the
United States. In recent years, we’ve seen numerous
cases of American citizens actively planning to murder
their neighbors—including you, me, and our relatives
and friends.”25 Fear of radicalization within the United
States led to the “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007,” based on the premise
that “[t]he promotion of violent radicalization, home-
grown terrorism, and ideologically-based violence exists
in the United States and poses a threat to homeland
security.”26 This anti-terrorism act passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 404-6, but the Senate did
not take it up.
In September, 2006, the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security launched a five-hearing investigation
into the threat of homegrown terrorism, culminating
in a 2008 report entitled “Violent Islamist Extremism,
the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat.”27
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The report conceded that the radicalization process
necessary to homegrown terrorism “has been less likely
to occur in the United States than in other countries,”
noting factors such as “the cultural influence of the
‘American experience,” “the absence of a sympathetic
audience in the United States,” and America’s “long-
standing tradition of absorbing varied diaspora popu-
lations.”28 Nonetheless, the Committee warned that
“radicalization is no longer confined to training camps
in Afghanistan or other locations far from our shores; it
is also occurring right here in the United States.”29
The Committee cited a “recent rise in acts of homegrown
terrorism planning and plotting” and hypothesized
that this “may be an early warning that domestic radi-
calization, inspired by violent Islamist ideology, has be-
come more likely in the United States.”30
In August 2007, the New York City Police Department
issued a comprehensive study of radicalization and the
homegrown threat, concluding, “Muslims in the U.S.
are more resistant, but not immune, to the radical
message.”31 The study examined 11 case studies of
individuals and groups that radicalized in the West and
identified four stages of radicalization through which
initially unremarkable individuals move to the point
where they engage in planning or executing a violent
attack. According to this study, the radicalization process
is marked by an increasing commitment to the “jihadi
ideology,” which “combines the extreme and minority
interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like
commitment or responsibility to solve global political
grievances through violence.”32 This ideology, the
authors noted, “is proliferating in Western democracies
at a logarithmic rate.”33 Starting the radicalization
process does not mean that an individual will engage
in a terrorist act, but radicalized individuals “may serve
as mentors and agents of influence to those who
might become the terrorists of tomorrow.” The study
recommends increased investments in intelligence col-
lection because “the subtle and non-criminal nature of
the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization
makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law
enforcement standpoint.”34
In 2009, a confluence of events refocused attention
on the homegrown threat. Authorities revealed that a
group of young Muslims from Minneapolis had traveled
to Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008 to join the radical or-
ganization Shabaab. One of them became America’s
first suicide bomber, killing 30 in Northern Somalia.35
In July, federal authorities announced the arrest and
guilty plea of a Muslim-American convert from Long Is-
land, who had received missile training in Afghanistan
and had provided information to al-Qaida about the
Long Island Rail Road system.36 Later that month, the
FBI arrested seven Muslims from North Carolina, who
are accused of plotting to commit suicide attacks
abroad and stockpiling a cache of weaponry. These
events prompted federal authorities to issue a bulletin
expressing concern “about the danger posed by little-
noticed Americans traveling abroad to learn terrorism
techniques, then coming back to the United States,
where they may be dormant for long periods of time
while they look for followers to recruit for future at-
tacks.”37
“Muslims in the U.S. are more resistant,
but not immune, to the
radical message.”
Commenting at the end of the eventful month of
July 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder said, “The
American people would be surprised at the depth of
the [homegrown] threat,” adding that “the whole
notion of radicalization is something that didn’t loom
as large a few months ago ... as it does now. And
that’s the shifting nature of threats that keeps you up
at night.”38
The spate of events continued into the fall. Over
the 9/11 anniversary, New York City was thrown into
tumult by the investigation of former city resident Na-
jibullah Zazi, who was eventually arrested and charged
with planning a bombing plot. Later in September,
two Muslims were arrested in plots to bomb buildings
in Dallas and Illinois. In October, two other Muslims
from Chicago were charged with plotting to murder
employees of a Copenhagen newspaper that published
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed.  Then, on No-
vember 5, Army psychiatrist Nidal Hasan opened fire
on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and
wounding scores more. Reports have indicated that
Hasan had communication with a radical cleric abroad
and had expressed radical views to his medical colleagues.
In December, David Headley, previously arrested in
relation to the Copenhagen plot, was charged with
assisting the 2008 terrorist rampage in Mumbai. 
3. MUSLIM-AMERICANS AND
TERRORISM-RELATED PROSECUTIONS
Projected through the lenses of politics and national
security, intensive media coverage tremendously
magnifies the terrorist threat. This is especially true
of homegrown terrorism, where individual suspects
are often known in their community and domestic
arrests and incidents heighten the sense of vulner-
ability. A close look at the data on homegrown
terrorism is necessary to put the magnitude of the
threat in perspective.
To measure the extent of the homegrown threat
arising from violent jihadi extremism, this project created
a dataset of Muslim-Americans who, since 9/11, have
1) perpetrated a terrorist act; 2) been convicted of a
terrorim-related offense that involved some aspect of
violence (including planning or directly supporting vio-
lence); or 3) been arrested or sought on such a charge.
These criteria were selected to capture indivduals who
have moved to the later phases of the radicalization
process, which, according to the FBI, requires both
adoption of radical ideology and development of the
willingness to engage in violent extremist activity.39
This study identified 139 Muslim-Americans with a
linkage to terrorist violence between September 11,
2001, and December 31, 2009, an average of about
17 people per year. (See the Appendix for a list of these
individuals and the criteria used to create this list.) Al-
though many of these individuals did not actually
commit acts of violence, the charges against them in-
dicated that they were planning, or had a willingness,
to do so.
The dataset contains information about both the
offenders and the nature of their activity. All but one of
the offenders are men.  Their average age is 28.  Almost
two-thirds (65%) are under 30. 
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forcement before their plots came to fruition or had
even matured to a dangerous state. Indeed, 33 of the
individuals, most of whom were charged with material
support for terrorism, were arrested before they had
joined a specified terrorist plot.
The activities of most of these individuals were tar-
geted abroad. Only 51 (37%) individuals executed or
plotted actions with targets in the United States. The
criminal activity of 47 offenders took place exclusively
abroad, and for more than half the offenders, at least
some aspect of their criminal conduct happened outside
the United States.
Well over half (78) of the individuals were arrested
as part of groups who appear to have radicalized
together and either traveled abroad for training or
began to plot attacks in the United States. These
groups include the following: 
• The Lackawanna group, which traveled to
Afghanistan and attended an al-Qaida training
camp;40
• The Portland group, which attempted to join forces
fighting against the United States in Afghanistan;41
• The northern Virginia group, which engaged in
military-style training domestically in support of
mission to join Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some individuals
traveled to training camps in Pakistan;42
• The California prison group, which radicalized while
in prison and plotted to attack domestic and inter-
national targets;43
• The group from Liberty City, Florida, which plotted
to bomb the Sears Tower;44
Almost two-thirds of the individuals are U.S.-born
(63) or naturalized citizens (22). Twenty-five are legal
residents and only 10 were in the United States illegally.  
The ethnicity of the offenders is diverse: 32 are
Arab, 24 are African-American, 24 are South Asian, 20
are Somali, and 20 are Caucasian. Just over one-third
(47) of the individuals are converts to Islam. Twenty-
four of the converts are African-American; ten are Cau-
casian; three are Latino. 
There has been no pattern or trend in terms of the
level of arrests and incidents per year since 9/11. Un-
doubtedly, there has been a spike of incidents and
arrests in 2009. A great deal of this is attributable to
the young Somali-Americans that left Minneapolis to
join the Shabaab. Even without this troubling episode,
there has been an abnormal amount of activity this
year.
It is noteworthy that of the 139 individuals, only 40
(29%) were successful in executing attacks (15) or
joining a foreign fighting force (25). Thus, seventy
percent of the offenders were preempted by law en-
• The Toledo/Chicago group, which trained and
plotted to attack U.S. troops in Iraq;45
• The group from Cherry Hill, New Jersey, which
plotted to attack Fort Dix;46
• The Minneapolis group, which includes young
men who traveled to Somalia and appear to have
joined the radical group Shabaab;47
• The group from Newburgh, New York, which is
charged with attempting to bomb synagogues in
the Bronx;48
• The North Carolina group, which is charged with
plotting to engage in terrorist acts in Israel;49 and
• The group from northern Virginia, which traveled
to Pakistan to join a jihadi group.50
The existence of these groups supports the theory,
promoted in the New York City Police Department
report and by scholar Marc Sageman, that the radical-
ization process often relies to a great extent on group
dynamics, where a bunch of disaffected young men
are attracted to a charismatic leader and, as a group,
isolate themselves from the mainstream and move to-
wards violence.
The geographic diversity of the offenders also
suggests that there is no single “hot-bed” of radicalism
in the United States that is generating large numbers
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This research project focused on four mid-sized
Muslim-American communities around the United
States.  We omitted the largest Muslim-American
communities, such as in Detroit or New York, and
instead selected mid-sized communities where our
researchers would be able to contact and interview
leaders at most of these sites’ Islamic organizations.
Furthermore, because each of these communities
has had some experience with isolated instances of
radicalization, each offers opportunities to examine
how Muslim-American organizations have in gener-
al responded to the challenges surrounding radical-
ization and homegrown terrorism.
There are approximately 30,000 to 50,000 Mus-
lims in Greater Seattle. Most are first-generation im-
migrants, with sizeable numbers from Somalia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first mosque in the region,
now known as the Islamic Center of Washington,
was founded in 1981. For two decades, the Center
was the focal point of Muslim cultural life and Is-
lamic educational programs in Seattle. Today, there
are more than 12 mosques in the greater Seattle
area representing a diversity of Islamic perspectives.
Some, such as the Muslim Association of Puget
Sound and the Ithna-Asheri Muslim Association of
the Northwest, have adopted more liberal ap-
proaches, while others, such as the Islamic Center of
the Eastside in Bellevue, Masjid Omar al-Farooq in
Mountlake Terrace, and the Islamic Center of Kent,
are more conservative. There are two full-time Is-
lamic schools in the area: the Islamic School of Seat-
tle and the Madina Academy in Redmond, Wash-
ington. There is also an active chapter of Council of
American-Islamic Relations, a national civil-rights
organization based in Washington, D.C.
The religious landscape of the city is buzzing
with interfaith activities in which many Muslims
participate. Most of our interview respondents
identified strongly as Muslim-Americans and spoke
fiercely against ideological or violent radicalization.
They distanced themselves from the incidents of
radicalization that have emerged in the region since
the 1990s. The first of these incidents involved
James Ujamaa, a civil rights leader turned Islamist
who led a group of local Muslims—mostly con-
verts—to practice target shooting in Blaine, Oregon;
Ujamaa later pled guilty to material support for a
foreign terrorist organization. A second case oc-
curred in July 2006, when Naveed Haq, a Pakistani-
American from Eastern Washington, shot and killed





of homegrown terrorism cases. Only 14 percent of
these individuals lived in the four largest Muslim-
American communities in the United States: the Chicago,
Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York metropolitan areas.
(This relatively low percentage confirms our project’s
decision to focus on mid-sized Muslim-American com-
munities.)  There were 43 offenders from the South, 38
from the Northeast, 30 from the Midwest, 23 from the
West, and 3 from the Southwest.
Of the 61 Muslim-Americans in the dataset who
were not part of the major groups, there is no single
pattern to how they radicalized. Only a few, like Ali al-
Marri, had close enough connections to al-Qaida to
be considered a member of a “sleeper cell.” Some, like
Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Mirza—two men from
The Buffalo metropolitan region is home to ap-
proximately 20,000 to 30,000 Muslims. Major eth-
nic communities include African-Americans and
African refugees in Buffalo proper, Yemenis and
Palestinians in Lackawanna, South Asians through-
out the suburbs, and a small Arab community in
Niagara Falls. The African-American Sunni commu-
nity is one of the oldest in the United States, and
the Yemeni community, which arrived in the area
after World War II to work in the steel and automo-
bile industry, is one of the most significant Arab
groups in the country. Many of them arrived after
the 1965 Immigration Act, as in other areas in the
country. Much of the community lives in working-
class neighborhoods, while some of the more recent
and more highly-educated immigrant families live
in wealthier suburbs. 
There are 10 active mosques in the area, with
two more due to open soon. Most of the mosques
are ethnically based. The Islamic Society of the Ni-
agara Frontier (ISNF), perhaps the best-attended
mosque in the region, is predominantly South Asian
but also includes a significant number of Arab and
other congregants. The next largest congregation in
the area is Masjid Zakariya, part of the Darul-
Uloom al-Madania, the largest Deobandi seminary
in the United States. This seminary operates a grade
school that combines religious education with a
standard New York State public-school curriculum,
as well as a bachelor’s-level program that trains
imams and other religious scholars. ISNF also oper-
ates an Islamic school, which prides itself on its in-
novative approach that stresses preparation of stu-
dents for professional success in American society.
In addition to these two full-time schools, most
mosques in the area run weekend classes and a va-
riety of programs for children. Sports play an im-
portant role in youth work. ISNF holds midnight
basketball games; Lackawanna has soccer clubs for
younger and older youth. 
Several organizations now connect different eth-
nic groups within the Muslim community. The most
prominent of these is the Muslim Political Action
Committee of Western New York (MPAC-WNY),
which grew out of activism in the 1980s when a
group of local Muslims began to reach out to Buffa-
lo’s civic and religious institutions. In recent years,
this group affiliated itself with MPAC, a California-
based organization that has sought to increase Mus-
lim-Americans’ political integration and representa-
tion. The Buffalo-area chapter is now the second
most active branch of the national organization.
The Imams Council was formed in 2008 as a way to
link various mosques in the region. Almost all of the
imams in the area are represented in the group. In
addition, the Muslim Students Association at the
University of Buffalo also serves to connect various
ethnic communities, as well as to bridge liberal and
conservative religious affiliations.
However, Muslim-Americans in Buffalo are most
widely known for the case of the “Lackawanna Six,”
a group of young Yemeni-Americans that attended
al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in early
2001. According to a book on the subject by jour-
nalist Dina Temple-Raston, there was little evidence
that these men had plans to engage in terrorist vio-
lence in the United States, but their association with
al-Qaida was a startling reminder of the possibility
of radicalization among Muslim-Americans.
Buffalo, New York
Houston who trained to fight against the United States
in Afghanistan—may have radicalized together in a
small group. Others, like Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet,
who opened fire at the El Al counter in the Los Angeles
airport, were disturbed loners, whose motives for their
actions remain unclear. Some, like Russell Defrietas,
charged with plotting to blow up fuel tanks at JFK
Airport, lived in the United States for decades, while
others, like Ahmed Mohammed, the student who put
an instructional bomb-making video on YouTube, were
more recent arrivals. Nidal Hasan, accused of murdering
13 in a shooting rampage at Fort Dix, adopted a
radical ideology, but there appears to have been a
complex interaction of forces—some ideological, and
some resulting from his position as a Muslim soldier
about to be deployed to Afghanistan—that moved
him toward violence.
There is no single profile or a common warning
sign that signifies a “homegrown terrorist.” The diversity
of the demographics, ethnicities, and life experiences
makes the problem of detecting the homegrown
terrorist an extremely difficult one for law enforcement.
Critics may claim that this dataset overstates the
extent of the problem of homegrown terrorism in the
United States. Cases are included in which the perpe-
trators are not American citizens, so long as there is
evidence that they lived in the United States for an ex-
tended period and that they likely radicalized while in
the United States. The dataset includes individuals for
whom evidence indicates their violent action resulted
from mental illness rather than adoption of a radical
ideology. Cases are also included where there has
been an arrest, but the trial is still pending. Finally, as
noted above, the offenders have executed violent
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An estimated 70,000 to 100,000 Muslims live
in the Houston metropolitan area. While most are
of Pakistani origin, there are Muslims from else-
where in South Asia, Iran, Arab countries, West
Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia. African-American
Muslims are also prominent in the community. 
The community has grown significantly since the
1960s, when the Islamic Society of Greater Houston
(ISGH) was founded by Pakistani immigrants. The
ISGH is the main umbrella organization for Muslims
in the Houston area. It operates dozens of mosques,
as well as several large, full-time Islamic schools.
The ISGH also helped to establish the Shifa Clinic in
Houston, where local Muslim physicians volunteer
to do pro bono work for poor residents of the area,
both Muslim and non-Muslim. Today, Houston is
home to over 40 large Islamic centers, with numer-
ous other places where Muslims congregate for dai-
ly or Friday prayers. 
In addition to religious organizations, Muslims in
Houston have established numerous ethnic associa-
tions, such as the Pakistani Association of Greater
Houston, the Arab American Cultural Center of
Houston, and the Egyptian American Association of
Houston. Educational institutions include youth
groups such as Crescent Youth and more traditional
seminaries such as the Arees Institute. The Pakistani
community also has a weekly newspaper in Urdu
and a 24-hour radio station in Urdu.  The Pakistani
community in Houston has been successful in en-
gaging the local political process, represented by
their own city council member, Masroor J. Khan.
Houston has experienced several isolated inci-
dents of Islamic radicalization. Two local men, Ko-
bie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza, were
indicted for providing support for the Taliban.
Williams pled guilty, and Mirza’s case is still pend-
ing. Another Muslim-American, Daniel Joseph Mal-
donado, who had lived in Houston for several
months, was arrested in East Africa for allegedly
participating in terrorist acts in Somalia. Houston
was also the site where Sarfaraz Jamal established
an Internet chat room, ClearGuidance.com, which
was shut down for allowing terrorist communica-
tions, though Jamal himself has not been indicted.
The only instance of extremist violence in the Hous-
ton area was committed by Mohammed Ali Alayed,
a college student who murdered an Israeli friend in




actions in only 30 percent of the cases. In many cases,
plots were at such an early stage that it is not at all
clear that the offenders would have engaged in vio-
lence.
Other critics might claim that the dataset understates
the problem. Individuals who were charged with a ter-
rorist crime but were acquitted at trial are, of course,
excluded. The dataset also does not include cases in-
volving exclusively non-violent activities, such as fundrais-
ing, even though these individuals provided forms of
material support to foreign terrorist organizations.
These cases are excluded because, in our view, individuals
have not fully radicalized unless they are willing and
have taken steps toward violent action to further their
radical views. Further, this dataset does not include
Muslims living in the United States for an extended
period who were deported on suspicion of having
links to terrorism. Complete data on these individuals
are not available from open sources. Even if this data
could be compiled, deportation would be an extremely
unreliable measurement of the extent of genuine radi-
calization. Most individuals suspected of a linkage to
terrorism have been deported based on technical im-
migration violations. No proof of the validity of suspicion
of terrorism has been required for deportation. For ex-
ample, hundreds of Muslims, some of whom had
longstanding ties to the United States, were deported
in connection with the investigation of the 9/11 attacks.
None of them were actually prosecuted for a terrorism
crime. Some of them may have been violent extremists;
some may be entirely innocent: it is impossible to know.
In sum, the dataset includes all cases in which a
person 1) is reported to be a practicing Muslim, 2) has
lived in the United States for an extended period, and
3) has engaged in terrorism, has been successfully
prosecuted for a terrorist offense that involved an
element of violence, or has been arrested on such a
charge. We believe that this dataset of 139 cases—
The Research Triangle, encompassing Raleigh,
Durham, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, is home
to an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Muslims. The
community is proud to trace its roots back more
than two centuries—North Carolina was home to
many African Muslims enslaved in the United
States.  Most famous among them was Omar Ibn
Said (1770-1864), the author of the only surviving
Arabic slave autobiography written in the United
States. Few of the slaves’ Islamic traditions or iden-
tities survived, but the Triangle area later became a
vibrant center for the Nation of Islam and the Sun-
ni movement that emerged out of it. Another
group of Muslims arrived in the 1960s, many of
them international students at local universities.
The largest Muslim institution in the area, the Is-
lamic Association of Raleigh, was founded by stu-
dents and graduates of North Carolina State Uni-
versity in Raleigh. With the help of donations from
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, they built a mosque, the
Islamic Center of Raleigh, in 1985. As the Islamic
Center’s members became successful professionals,
it became independent of foreign donations. While
the initial leadership of the Center was primarily
Arab, it now includes among its volunteers, leaders,
and attendees Muslims from India, Pakistan, Bang-
ladesh, several African regions, African-Americans,
white and Latino American converts, Malaysians,
Chinese, and even some Tibetan Muslims.
The Center has grown to include two part-time
and one full-time school. It has established a yearly
health fair for the neighborhood, and it supported
the founding of the Mariam Clinic, a full-time
medical center for needy Muslims and non-Mus-
lims. The Center also participates in and organizes
interfaith events and dialogues with local politi-
cians and law enforcement. In recent years, the
Center has become active in voter registration and
outreach to non-Muslim communities, including
the predominantly African-American neighborhood
in which the Center is located.
This increased involvement in public life is evi-
dent at most of the eight mosques in the Triangle.
Two local African-American
Muslims have been elected concluded next page
Research Triangle, NC
while imperfect—provides the most accurate reflection
of the the problem of homegrown violent jihadi ex-
tremism currently available from open sources. 
When examining the data and discussing the extent
of this terrorist threat, it is important to consider the
context of overall security. That this many Muslim-
Americans radicalized while living in this country and
engaged in or plotted violence is discomforting. Even
more disturbing is the possibility that had they not
been arrested, many of them may have perpetrated
serious acts of violence here or abroad. Nonetheless,
in terms of overall levels of violence in America, the
amount of radicalization and violence that has been
perpetrated by Muslim-Americans over the past eight
years is quite small. To put this in perspective, there
have been more than 136,000 murders in the United
States since 9/11.51 Thirty-one—a fiftieth of one per-
cent—of these murders were committed by persons
listed in the dataset. 
The media attention that accompanies nearly every
arrest or thwarted plot involving Muslim-Americans
magnifies our perception of the homegrown terrorism
threat. Homegrown terrorism is certainly a serious and
potentially dangerous problem, but it is a limited
problem. The recent spike of cases in 2009 is disturbing,
but it is far too early to know if this is an aberration or
a trend. Even if the levels of radicalization of Muslim-
Americans do increase, it is important to emphasize
that the numbers of individuals engaged in these  ac-
tivities are extremely small. 
One possible reason for the small number of radi-
calized, violent Muslim-Americans involves the demo-
graphics of the Muslim-American population in the
United States. Unlike Muslim minorities in many countries
of Western Europe, Muslim-Americans have attained
higher education and middle-class incomes at roughly
the same rate as society as a whole. Their lives are less
segregated than in Western Europe, and their political
views on most issues are similar to other Americans.
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to public office—North Carolina State Senator Larry
Shaw and Durham City Councilman Farad Ali—and
immigrant communities encourage their members
to become more active citizens. One notable exam-
ple of this development is a 2008 intensive sum-
mer course for young Muslims in the Triangle
Youth Leadership Program, which was organized in
partnership with Duke University’s Hart Leadership
Program by volunteers from Islamic Association of
Raleigh, the Shaw University Mosque, the Islamic
Association of Cary, and the Ibad ur-Rahman
mosque in Durham. This program trained more
than 20 Muslim high school and college students
in political and civic activism, in what the organiz-
ers hope will be an ongoing event. Other Islamic
organizations, such as the Raleigh chapter of Mus-
lim American Society (MAS) and Muslim American
Public Affairs Council of North Carolina—like many
similar Muslim advocacy groups—also engage in
civic education.  
Until this year, the Triangle has had only one in-
cident of radicalization: Mohammad Reza Taheri-
Azar, a recent graduate of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, drove through a crowded
part of campus in an attempt to run people over as
a protest against U.S. foreign policy toward Muslim
countries. Taheri-Azar pled guilty to nine counts of
attempted murder, one for each of the people
whom he hit. However, by his own account and re-
ports from local Muslim-Americans, Taheri-Azar
was not a member of any local Islamic organiza-
tions, and our interview respondents dismissed his
actions as those of a psychologically unstable loner.
The recent arrests of seven Muslim-Americans in
the Raleigh area, on charges of preparing to en-
gage in terrorism overseas, strike more directly at
the heart of the Muslim-American community,
since the suspects had formerly been active in local
Islamic organizations. (See “North Carolina Terror-
ism Arrests,” beginning next page.)
Research Triangle (cont.)
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The arrest of seven Muslim men on terrorism
charges in August, 2009, in the Raleigh-Durham,
NC, region—a community studied during this proj-
ect—presents many of the issues regarding home-
grown terrorism that confront law enforcement and
Muslim-American communities across the nation. 
The indictment charged that American Daniel
Boyd—a Muslim convert—his two sons, and four
other men, conspired to “advance violent jihad” by
participating in and providing support for terrorist
activities outside the United States, including mur-
der and suicide bombing.1 The government alleges
that some of the defendants traveled to Israel, Jor-
dan, Pakistan and Kosovo to commit violent acts
and illegally stockpiled weapons and engaged in
military style training in North Carolina to prepare
for jihadi activities.2 Boyd was allegedly recorded
saying, “I love jihad. I love to stand there and fight
for the sake of Allah. Muslims must be protected at
all costs.”3 More than 27,400 rounds of ammuni-
tion, gas masks, and a handbook on how authori-
ties respond to acts of terrorism were seized from
Boyd’s home.4 
As with many homegrown terrorism cases across
the country, the Muslim community initially ex-
pressed surprise and skepticism about the govern-
ment’s charges, worried that there would be a
backlash against the community due to the arrests,
and denied that any radicalization emanated from
their mosques or the community in general.  
Boyd’s wife stridently proclaimed her husband’s
innocence and was supported by the local Muslim
American Society (MAS), which called on the media
to respect the presumption of innocence and asked
Americans not to cast aspersion on the Muslim
community as a result of the as yet, unproven
charges. When asked about Boyd’s alleged views
that Muslims had a religious duty to engage in vio-
lence in defense of Islam, a MAS spokesperson re-
sponded, “there is no Islamic leader and no Islamic
community in this country that would back
that.”5 Outside the courtroom where the de-
fendants’ preliminary hearing was held, a
community member, 37-year-old Shagufta
Syad, said, “Maybe there’s some bad Muslims in
there, but just because you have a head scarf and
faith in your heart doesn’t mean we’re aliens. ... I
just want justice to be served. I’m here concerned
as a Muslim; as an American, I need to know what’s
going on.”6 
Although the indictment noted that the defen-
dants stopped attending prayer services at the
Raleigh masjids in 2009 “due to ideological differ-
ences,”7 evidence that the defendants had attended
the largest mosque in the region, the Islamic Center
of Raleigh, raised questions about the mosque’s
level of cooperation with law enforcement. A Mus-
lim graduate student who formerly attended the Is-
lamic Center told CNN that two of the defendants,
Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Yaghi, had said during
discussions at the mosque that Osama bin Laden
was a great scholar and fighter and that suicide
bombings benefiting Muslims were permissible.8
The student told mosque authorities about Hassan
and Yaghi’s radical talk. The Islamic Center later
confirmed that it reported a person’s “violent
threatening action” to the
FBI.9
North Carolina Terrorism Arrests
concluded next page
Many immigrants—who, according to various estimates,
compose about one-half to two-thirds of the Muslim-
American population—came to the United States for
educational or economic opportunities, and this pop-
ulation still retains an optimistic view of the United
States as a land of opportunity. However, demographic
differences are not the whole story. Surveys and other
studies have found significant pockets of poverty, seg-
regation, discrimination, and resentment among Mus-
lim-Americans.52 Yet these phenomena have not led
to violence on a large scale. The next section of this
report examines what Muslim-American communities
have done to ensure that this scale remains limited.
It is important for policymakers to understand the
factors internal to Muslim-American communities
that have helped to prevent violent radicalization
of Muslim-Americans. Thus far, our law enforcement
efforts have thwarted almost all of the small number
of Muslim-Americans who appear to have been
willing to perpetrate terrorist violence in the United
States.  In addition, this report highlights the pre-
ventative measures that have been taken, and
continue to be taken, within Muslim-American
communities. Our research has identified five sig-
nificant ways in which Muslim-American commu-
nities have counteracted radicalization, ranging
from statements to concrete actions:






Some of these steps were taken directly in response
to concerns about radicalization; others were taken
to pursue goals such as community-building or
political empowerment, but may have had the
side-effect of reducing the potential for radicalization. 
After describing the project’s research methods,
this section discusses each of these five steps in turn.
For each of the four research sites, the project com-
piled a list of all Muslim-American organizations in the
metropolitan area, based on websites, directories, and
personal contacts. The project reviewed as many print
and electronic publications associated with these or-
ganizations as could be obtained. During the fieldwork
portion of the project, the project’s research assistants
—graduate students with advanced training in interview
methods—contacted as many of these organizations
as possible and requested interviews with organizational
leaders and members, as well as with other individuals
in the local Muslim-American community. Interviewees
gave written consent for audio-recorded interviews
and selected whether they wished to be named or re-
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Despite statements that mosque leaders contact-
ed law enforcement about a community member,
commentator Robert Spencer, without citing facts to
support his view, insinuated that Boyd and his fol-
lowers were exposed to radical ideology at the Is-
lamic Center of Raleigh. Writing in the on-line pub-
lication Human Events, Spencer asked rhetorically:
“What was taught to Daniel “Saifullah” Boyd in the
Islamic Center of Raleigh that led him to embark
upon a path of betrayal of his homeland and peo-
ple?”10 He then accused law enforcement authori-
ties of “passivity” for not requiring mosque authori-
ties to provide “a more honest and thoroughgoing
confrontation of the jihad doctrine and Islamic su-
premacism [sic].”11
This is a typical pattern in many of the arrests of
Muslim-Americans on terrorism charges since Sep-
tember 11.  An arrest is announced, but because
the case is at an early stage, there if often little di-
rect evidence that the accused engaged in or had
actively plotted violent activities. The Muslim-Amer-
ican community denounces terrorist violence, but
voices skepticism about the charges
and calls for impartial justice.  Angry
voices on the internet then use the
unproven charges to lash out against
the defendants and cast aspersion on the broader
Muslim-American community.  
As we have seen with the North Carolina case—
and now the Fort Hood shootings—any new
episode of suspected homegrown terrorism gains
massive media attention and causes security con-
cerns in the local communities and across the coun-
try, leaving Muslim-Americans frustrated and disil-
lusioned, both by the actions of their fellow Mus-
lims and how the specter of homegrown terrorism
disrupts and complicates their lives as Muslim-
Americans. 





main anonymous in the research. All of the interviews
were conducted at private locations chosen by the re-
spondents.
The project sought to interview both men and
women, members of different generations and major
immigration and citizenship statuses, all of the major
ethnicities and nationalities within the local Muslim-
American community, and members of both religious
and non-religious organizations. The project wound
up with an imbalance in the gender of respondents
(approximately two-thirds male and one-third female),
but achieved its targets in other demographic charac-
teristics, including approximately one-quarter of re-
spondents of Arab descent, one-quarter of South Asian
descent, one-quarter of African and African-American
descent, and one quarter of other backgrounds, such
as respondents of European, Iranian, Turkish, and
Southeast Asian descent. Since the project involved in-
depth interviews, rather than survey questionnaires,
the number of interviews was limited to approximately
30 individuals in each of the four research sites. With
this small sample size, the respondents were not
intended to be statistically representative of Muslim-
American communities.
The interview began with general questions about
the respondent and the local Muslim-American com-
munity, including the respondent’s view of the major
accomplishments and concerns of Muslim communities
in the area? We then turned to the issue of radicalization:
“Our research project is interested in learning about
efforts within American Muslim communities to prevent
radicalization. What efforts in this area do you think
we should highlight?” We then asked: “Some Americans
are clearly concerned about possible radicalization
within Muslim-American communities. Some have re-
ferred to the potential for ‘homegrown terrorism.’ Do
you share these concerns? Why or why not?” As a fol-
low-up, the interview then asked whether the respon-
dent had heard of alarming statements or activities in
the local community, and how the community had re-
sponded in these instances. The interview then asked
what else the respondent suggested that local Muslims
should do to make sure that radicalization does not
occur in the future.
The interviews were not intended to probe for
illegal activities, and none was disclosed. However,
given the sensitivity of the issues in the interview,
some respondents may have wished to provide an
overly rosy image of the local Muslim-American com-
munity. To mitigate this possibility, the project cross-
checked information with additional respondents and
with digital searches of local newspapers. No significant
discrepancies were discovered.
1. PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE DENUNCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE
We have found that an important anti-radicalization
activity of Muslim-American communities since
9/11 has been the  active denunciation of terrorist
violence. Muslim-Americans have done so in public
and in private, drawing on both religious and
secular arguments. Much of this has gone unnoticed
in the mainstream press, and many Americans
wonder—erroneously—why Muslims have been
silent on the subject. New York Times columnist
Thomas L. Friedman, for example, wrote in 2005,
“The Muslim village has been derelict in condemning
the madness of jihadist attacks.”53 Such comments
overlook the fatwa issued on September 27, 2001,
by senior Islamic scholars in the United States and
the Middle East, urging Muslims to support military
action against the perpetrators of 9/11: 
All Muslims ought to be united against all
those who terrorize the innocents, and
those who permit the killing of non-com-
“All Muslims ought to be united 
against all those 
who terrorize the innocents....”
batants without a justifiable reason. Islam
has declared the spilling of blood and the
destruction of property as absolute prohibi-
tions until the Day of Judgment. ... [It is]
necessary to apprehend the true perpetrators
of these crimes, as well as those who aid
and abet them through incitement, financing
or other support. They must be brought to
justice in an impartial court of law and [pun-
ished] appropriately. ... [It is] a duty of
Muslims to participate in this effort with all
possible means.54
This was one of numerous similar statements by
many prominent Muslim leaders around the world.55
In the United States, Muslim-Americans also expressed
outrage at the attacks, then and later. One such doc-
ument, drafted by the Fiqh Council of North America
and endorsed by the Council on American-Islamic Re-
lations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America
(ISNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Asso-
ciation of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the Association
of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE), the Muslim
Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and more than 130
Muslim organizations, mosques and leaders in the
United States, stated this forcefully:
We have consistently condemned terrorism
and extremism in all forms and under all cir-
cumstances, and we reiterate this unequiv-
ocal position. Islam strictly condemns religious
extremism and the use of violence against
innocent lives. There is no justification in
Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting
civilians’ life and property through suicide
bombings or any other method of attack is
haram—prohibited in Islam—and those who
commit these barbaric acts are criminals,
not ‘martyrs.’ 56
Muslim American websites and publications routinely
repeat these views.
Muslim American Society: 
In the wake of a second series of blasts to
hit London just two weeks after the July 7
bombing, the Muslim American Society re-
news its condemnation of such evil acts
and commitment to exonerate Islam from
such acts in order to deny terrorists any reli-
gious, ideological or political legitimacy.
MAS categorically denounces all terrorism
regardless of affiliation or national origin.57
Islamic Circle of North America: 
These violent acts by those who claim to
represent Islam are against the teachings
of Islam and the practices of the prophet
Mohammad.58
Council on American-Islamic Relations: 
We, the undersigned Muslims, wish to state
clearly that those who commit acts of terror,
murder and cruelty in the name of Islam
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“These violent acts by those who claim to represent
Islam are against the teachings of Islam 
and the practices of the prophet Mohammad.”
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are not only destroying innocent lives, but
are also betraying the values of the faith
they claim to represent. No injustice done
to Muslims can ever justify the massacre of
innocent people, and no act of terror will
ever serve the cause of Islam. We repudiate
and dissociate ourselves from any Muslim
group or individual who commits such brutal
and un-Islamic acts.59
Muslim Political Action Committee: 
It is our duty as American Muslims to protect
our country and to contribute to its better-
ment. Since September 11, 2001, intelligence
reports indicate that international terrorist
networks continue to plan attacks against
the United States. In the face of such a
frightening possibility, and being aware of
the disastrous consequences that may befall
the country as a whole and the Muslim
community in particular, it is obvious that
Muslims should be at the forefront of the
effort to prevent this from happening.60
The Minaret: 
Peace is not an alternative; it is a necessity
for the true comprehension of the divine
message. One does not attack those who
are the intended recipient of the divine
message. If we want to show our commit-
ment to peace, then we must go beyond
words and rhetoric. The least that we can
do is express our condemnation of the
killing done in the name of religion regardless
of the victims and perpetrators.61
There is only one Muslim-American organization, a
tiny group called the Islamic Thinkers Society, that openly
espouses violence—abroad, not in the United States. It
denounces all of the larger Muslim-American organizations
as “so-called Muslim organizations and their spiritually
impotent and politically retarded ‘leadership.’”62
Some observers fear that these denunciations are
intended solely for public consumption by non-Muslims
and do not reflect Muslim-Americans’ true beliefs. Our
fieldwork suggests that this is not the case. In North
Carolina, for example, the local imam warned congre-
gants against pamphlets that he considered “dangerous.”
In Buffalo, a local group ran an anti-terrorism workshop
for Muslim-Americans. In each of the four research
sites, Muslim-Americans frequently characterized terrorists
as mentally ill.
Among religiously liberal Muslim-Americans, de-
nunciations of violence emphasized the themes that
they viewed as the spirit of Islam, including tolerance
of diversity, intercommunal coexistence, and support
for democratic politics. Quotations from the Qur’an
and the hadith—eyewitness reports of the sayings
and actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his com-
panions—are common in discussions of these topics. 
Religiously conservative Muslim-Americans are just
as vehement in denouncing violence. Their critique
Religiously conservative Muslim-Americans
are just as vehement
in denouncing violence 
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often centers on the importance of ethical practices,
with an insistence on the “middle path” (as opposed
to extremism) and “correct” orthodox belief, which
they understand to mean apolitical piety. Conversations
on these topics often referred to Qur’anic verses and
hadith reports that require obedience to the laws of
the land, sober and modest comportment, and proper
treatment of strangers. These themes are especially
visible among Salafi communities in the U.S. The term
Salafi, which means a follower of the first generations
of Muslims (the salaf), has been adopted by some
terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere.63
However, the term is far more commonly used to refer
to an intense form of personal religiosity, with no
political implications. With this understanding in mind,
according to a survey of American mosques conducted
in 2000, almost 70 percent of mosque administrators
identified “the teachings of the righteous salaf” as an
important source of authority.64 This came to be mis-
interpreted in the American media as “Salafi teachings,”
which supposedly provide “a lot of quiet help—as well
as a hiding place [for] would-be terrorists.”65 By
contrast, the self-described Salafis that our project in-
terviewed were among the most hostile to radical
Islamic movements, which they considered haram, re-
ligiously impermissible. “We are not really concerned
with politics, you know, those are affairs you can’t
change,” one self-described Salafi imam told us. “Change
really comes from Allah, you know. ... A lot of that stuff
[politics] gets people distracted from what’s really im-
portant.”66
Our research indicated that Muslim-Americans do
not support terrorism directed at the United States or
innocent civilians. At the same time, some of our inter-
viewees were less quick to condemn other acts of vio-
lence outside the United States in instances where
they considered the targets to be part of a genuine
armed conflict. Because this project focuses exclusively
on domestic terrorism, we did not attempt to gauge
the extent of this support or probe interviewees on
these issues.
2. SELF-POLICING
Our project finds that Muslim-Americans’ statements
denouncing terrorism have been reinforced with
concrete actions in their communities to monitor
signs of radicalization. The rarity of terrorism in the
United States means that few Muslim-Americans
have ever encountered an actual terrorist, or even
an individual who has expressed a willingness to
engage in violence. Nonetheless, our research in-
dicates that Muslim-Americans are engaged in a
heightened level of self-policing against radicalization
that may help to account for the infrequency of
terrorist activities by Muslim-Americans. 
Even before 9/11, terrorist organizations considered
Muslim-American communities to be unlikely collabo-
rators. Although a variety of radical Islamic movements
sought to raise funds in the United States for their rev-
olutionary campaigns abroad, there has been little re-
cruitment of Muslim-Americans for domestic terrorism
in the United States. In fact, according to interrogation
summaries made available by the government, Khalid
Sheik Mohammed forbade the 9/11 hijackers from
Even before 9/11, terrorist organizations
considered Muslim-American communities
to be unlikely collaborators 
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confiding in Muslim-Americans. He “explicitly told Mo-
hammad Atta and the other pilots and muscle operatives
not to speak with any Muslims once in the United
States. The only exception to this rule was concerning
Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, whom he in-
structed to contact an Islamic Center or Mosque to
help them get settled in the country since they did not
speak English.”67 To our knowledge, no Muslim-Amer-
icans have been indicted for knowingly aiding or
abetting the 9/11 attacks.
Since 9/11, Muslim-Americans have been attentive
to possible radicalization when it appears. In Houston,
for example, a Muslim religious leader harshly scolded
a man who “told me that he would’ve been proud if it
was his sons [who were responsible for 9/11]. ... I
whupped the hell out of him, afterwards he left with a
different disposition. Now, we don’t know where
people come from, we don’t know what experiences
they’ve had that have shaped them. So, I’m not going
to judge him, because when he got the right information,
his disposition changed.”68 In North Carolina, another
religious leader said he called the FBI when a young
man in the community appeared to be on the verge of
violence (see “I Called the FBI,” this page). Another
man said he called the authorities when a friend of his
started talking angrily about possibly avenging civilian
casualties in Iraq:
He was talking about how bridges are going
to be blown up into the sky, and stuff, and I
was really thinking, somebody is going to
do something like this, the way this friend
A young person who came from a broken family
... he had just finished high school and had come
back to Raleigh, where he went to middle school.
The one who really noticed his radical views was his
roommate. And that was very good. When he came
and met with me, he
said, “I have to talk
with you about some
very important is-
sues.” I said, “What
is the problem?” He said, “One of my roommates, I
feel like he has some radical views.” I said, “It’s
good that you came.” He said, “Will this be confi-
dential?” I said, “Don’t worry about confidentiality.
Anything you say here, this is a trust with God, with
Allah. We will never tell this person, but we will try
to help, because if you don’t tell us, maybe it will
turn into something worse.” He finally told me
about the person, so I knew exactly what the issue
was. Now that I had the information, what did I do
with it? We have a youth counselor, and I talked to
him, he is in charge of our youth programs, and so I
said, “You know that person?” He said, “Yeah.” I
said, “What is with him?” He said, “He is not from
our community, he just came here a few months
back.” I said, “I have some information about him
that worries me. He has some radical views.” He
said, “No, he jokes sometimes.” I said, “No. Be-
cause sometimes people start joking, and nobody
corrects them, and it becomes a fact—especially at
that age. ... 
We knew a person who worked with him—he
was a construction worker. He [the youth counselor]
talked to the person who hired him, at least he
would know what is going on, if  he noticed any of
those issues, at least he can come and see me and
we can talk to him. I said that I am ready to talk
with that person, but not at the beginning, because
of the age gap, he would say, “Why does that old
man want to talk with me?” Let’s just give it time,
but at the same time, we have to watch all of his
actions and statements, maybe it would lead to
things we can help him with. ... 
The man who hired him came and said, “I have
some news.” I said, “What is going on?” He said,
“You remember the person we were talking about?”
I said, “Yes.” He said, “His mom”—the mom of the
youth, she doesn’t come to the masjid—she came
to him, to his employer, from the masjid, and said,
“Please help me—my son, I don’t have any control
over him any more. He
could become very radical.
I Called the FBI
concluded next page
of mine was talking. I was suspicious of the
way he was talking with me. I called the FBI
myself, and I told them this person, this name,
this telephone number. ... 
The way he talked, it wasn’t comfortable
for me. He wasn’t saying, “I’m going to
blow up and kill people,” but the way he
talked, from seeing what’s going on in Iraq,
he was so unhappy with all this killing in
Iraq, all the children. And he was upset. I
thought he would do something wrong. 
But when I called the FBI, they laughed at
me. They didn’t even care about it. They
wouldn’t even take a name. They wouldn’t
even take a phone number. My friend, he’s
married with four children, and I don’t think
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anything about it now, but he was upset at
that moment, and I thought, maybe he’ll
go too far.69
Of the more than 120 interviews conducted for
this project, only one respondent expressed hesitancy
about reporting a potential act of terrorism to the au-
thorities. 
In the African-American and African-Amer-
ican Muslim community, all we are concerned
about is taking care of your family. That’s all
we’re concerned about. ... We need to eat—
we ain’t got the time to be concerned doing
the police’s job. ...
It’s like this, I’ll tell you from the heart. If I
knew of a plot that a thousand airplanes,
I saw that he doesn’t even respect me. He doesn’t
talk to me about any of these issues, but I am start-






and maybe talk to the imam to see if he can talk to
him.” It came from Allah’s heart, directly. Then,
when we started talking about these issues, he left.
A few days later, he just left for New York. His idea
was to go and make an explosion, or to harm socie-
ty, somewhere. And I said, “Now it’s become seri-
ous, it’s a threat, we should not take it lightly. I
know we have no chance to fix the person, but at
least we should call the authorities.” And really,
that’s when I called the FBI. I said, that’s it, this is
the information we have. And they were very coop-
erative. They took down all the information, and
they said, “Don’t worry. We’ll get all the informa-
tion.” ...  
I don’t know what the FBI did, because later,
they said, “We took care of it, don’t worry.” And
the other FBI agent, he knows his father, from New
York state. And somehow they approached the fa-
ther. And they really took it seriously. ... I reached
the point where I felt, I have to report this to the
authorities, because if, Allah forbid, if he left and
did something, even just harming himself, I would
be liable before Allah, why didn’t I tell the authori-
ties so that they could stop him. ... They handled it
very well, professionally. They talked to his father,
and told him to be careful. We talked to his boss
here, we asked him to come, because we didn’t
want him to go out of the region, because we didn’t
know in New York, who he is linked with. And he
brought him back. He said, “We have work for you,
inshallah.” And I said, “At that age, you have a fu-
ture”—because he is not studying at a university, he
just finished high school. “At least he can work with
me, I can give you a good salary, because working
in the construction field, inshallah in the future you
will work for yourself, you will find a wife.” And he
came back, with that kind of treatment. And now,
he has become a very good person. Even the FBI
called me after he came back and said, “With that
procedure, he has become a better person.” 107
I Called the FBI (cont.)
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all at once, were to fall out of the sky—if I
knew that there was another Timothy
McVeigh was going to rise up, and I had
absolute knowledge of it—I wouldn’t care. 
Interviewer: Really? 
I wouldn’t care. I say that as an African-
American and as a Muslim. 
Interviewer: But... 
I wouldn’t care. 
Interviewer: What about saving human
lives? 
Saving what? I’m concerned about me. I’m
concerned about me and my family.70
Other studies have found similar views among
African-American Christians (i.e., not wanting to have
anything to do with law enforcement officers, even
some guilty pleasure about the victimization of white
Americans),71 but we saw no further evidence of it in
our study. The other respondents in the area—including
African-American Muslims—who were asked about
this respondent’s opinion, rejected it entirely. One of
the community’s leading Islamic scholars, an African-
American man, said, “I would say that that individual
does not understand Islam.”
When I give khutbas, I tell people, “Look,
don’t come here with that foolishness. I’ll
tell you right now that I’ll call the police
right now. And you can call me a snitch or
a rat, but call me a Muslim.” 71
Other Muslim organizations have not waited passively
to learn about possible radicalization, but have instead
organized events with teenagers and young adults, raising
controversial topics that might identify potential problems.
In Seattle, for example, an Islamic Sunday school raised
such issues in order to counsel students who overreact.
[The teachers] bring up very, very critical is-
sues that you see in the media, that you see
out there, and they are doing it on purpose,
to see the response of the youth, to see
how they are reacting. Are they reacting in
a very violent manner? If they see that, typ-
ically after class they pull the youth over to
the side, not like in terms of, “Oh, you stay
after class.” But afterwards, everyone gathers
in the masjid, you know, they are playing
around and doing different activities. Typi-
cally, the teacher takes them for a chai [tea],
and starts talking about the topic, saying,
“You know, Imam Ali said this [this means
that the mosque is Shi‘a, not Sunni], the
Prophet Muhammad, may peace be upon
him, said this.” and so on and so forth,
trying to  have them understand that these
things are not really options. If it persists,
I’m very sure that those teachers would be
speaking to the parents, because there are
“I’ll tell you right now that I’ll call the police right
now.  And you can call me a snitch or a rat, 
but call me a Muslim.”
parent-teacher conferences every three
months or so. I think they make it very, very
clear, because they write extensive reports
on the students.73
In Houston, an organization that works with Mus-
lim-American youths arranged what one of the group’s
founders called “venting sessions.” (See “Venting Ses-
sions,” this page.) These sessions encourage participants
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In terms of directing their anger, that is some-
thing that is a part of our objective. ... We help
them direct and vent their anger properly. Meaning,
we’ll have circles and we’ll talk, “So what do you
think about this killing of Jews?” Or, “Do we hate
the Jews?” “Are we supposed to hate them?” When
the firebombs in Gu-
jarat [India] hap-
pened, we talked
about that. ... Let’s
talk about it openly.
It would be done in a private setting. No parents al-
lowed. No imams allowed. No administration al-
lowed. No adults allowed. And we would just talk
and vent. ... 
That removes people spitting thoughts into their
heads or Shaytan [Satan] coming into their heads
and saying you need to do something, and you
need to do X, Y, and Z. It removes them talking to
their cousins or relatives in Gaza or Karachi or La-
hore or Islamabad, saying “I hate this,” and them
saying, “Well, if you want to do something about it,
come here and let’s do something here.” It removes
any unnecessary anger that they might display in
school. Any kinds of acts of racism that might come
from them, whether it be vandalizing synagogues or
churches. Whatever it may be, we don’t want to fall
into that trap. ... 
We’ve never seen anyone that goes to these de-
structive measures. This is a prevention program.
We have not seen anyone that has gone into it.
We’ve seen people talking trash. ... They talk trash,
but it’s nothing substantial. You know, there are
people at these rallies who are singing the Hezbol-
lah or Hamas songs and you are like, “What’s going
on?” But it’s nothing substantial. 
[At the sessions,] first we incite emotions from
them. We say, “So what do you think about killing
the Jews? ... I heard so and so talk about killing the
Jews and started thinking about it, what do you
think we should do?” Or, “We heard someone talk
about Gujarat or Chechnya, these Russians?” And
we’ll get them to say, “Yeah, yeah.” Okay, then they
talk and once they’re done, I mean they know why
they are there, so we can properly vent. So, after
that the first thing we do is to discuss why Allah
causes destruction, why these things are meant to
happen, why does Allah allow, you know, the peo-
ple of New Orleans to be wiped out. So we go back
and talk about the people of ‘Ad and Lut and talk
about why Allah allows these sort of things to hap-
pen because sometimes people lose hope and
they’re like, “Why does God do this?” “There is no
God,” so we talk about hope and fear, that there
should be a balance between these two things.
And then we talk about what the Prophet, peace be
upon him, said about rebelling against the rulers.
And that it’s completely forbidden ... and then we
talk about it’s a pact in this country that you have
to stay calm, and then we talk about patience.
Everything that we have said to you, Satan still
comes to you, you have to remain patient and see
the bigger picture. Don’t look at the smaller picture,
look at the bigger goal. Then, we talk about how
Muslims are guaranteed victory, how Imam Mahdi
[the Messiah] is going to come. Jesus is going to
come. We don’t have to do anything, we have to
wait. And that is the “greater jihad” to wait. To
struggle against oneself.108
Venting Sessions
to express feelings of anger, prejudice, and hostility
about difficult issues in order to counteract them. This
approach is controversial, since it raises raw emotions
that could potentially instigate radicalization rather
than calm it. However, the outcome seems to have
been effective. While it is disturbing that negative
attitudes exist, none of the participants in these
sessions, to our knowledge, has ever been accused of
terrorist activity. In addition, these sessions are pro-
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active attempts in the community to address potential
radicalization, not just responses to instances after
they occur.
Muslim-Americans have also become more cautious
about the content of messages delivered in mosques.
In Seattle, one mosque reviews the texts of sermons in
advance of Friday prayers:
With our Juma [Friday midday prayer], we
have a khutba [sermon] committee, and
we screen our khateebs [lecturers] to make
sure that the khutba is inspiring instead of
mongering fear among the Muslims, so I
think that helps with keeping us balanced.
... So far we haven’t had to tell a khateeb
that they are not welcome back, but we
are willing to do that.74
The Islamic Society of Greater Houston, which op-
erates most of the mosques in the area, also screens
prayer leaders.
There is a khateeb committee which certifies
local people who give them the training,
what to say, what not to say, what is allowed,
what is not allowed, educate them that the
audience are from every school of thought.
... If there is somebody coming from out of
town, who the community does not know,
then they have to go through the screening
from the executive body, from the president
and the executive. They have a list from the
State Department of blacklisted organizations
and blacklisted people, so we do see that
they don’t belong to any of those, and then
we get statements from them that they are
not associated with any of those organiza-
tions that are blacklisted.75
In Buffalo, where Muslim-Americans have been
under intense scrutiny since the conviction of the Lack-
awanna Six, mosques perform significant background
checks on proposed speakers. Even before the Lack-
awanna case, local mosques were uneasy about radical
We monitor the groups that come through
our masjids. There’s no other way to say it. We
monitor our masjids. If you want to speak at our
masjids, we want to know who you are and
what you’re going to talk about. You’re not just
going to come in and speak to our youth and
we’re going to be disappointed with certain
things after you start talking. That’s not going to
happen anymore.  
Interviewer: Is this a result of Lackawanna? 
Yes, a direct result. 
Interviewer: Are all the masjids in the area
involved in this? 
Yes. We told the imams, “Look, you have to
know who comes and talks at your mosque, and
we want to know what you talk about. We’re
not going to let somebody talk after the prayer
and then you radicalize them. We’re not going
back to that—those are the old days, they are
over.” ...
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of
a case when you monitored the masjids and you
saw somebody who came in and you thought
was not appropriate and you asked them to
leave?   
Yes, we did. We asked them to leave—peace-
fully. Let me back up. It was an individual. Be-
fore we could physically remove him, we had to
find out what were our rights with law enforce-
ment. So we talked to the law enforcement on
what steps we should take. And we took those
steps. They can go to another masjid, but
they’re going to be monitored there too. So we
asked him kindly, saying we’re not comfortable
with this, and if not, we’re going to forcefully re-
move this person. 
There is no nice way about this [removing
someone], I don’t know how you can be nice
about this. It’s a problem because Muslims are
very nice people, but there is really no nice way
of removing a person out of the masjid. In a case
like this, you have to confront the person and ask
him to leave.109
We Monitor Our Masjids
imams who occasionally visited the area. One imam
who came through in early 2001 and spoke of revolu-
tionary jihad at the main Yemeni mosque was immedi-
ately banned from the premises. The militant who re-
cruited six local youths to attend training camps in
Afghanistan in early 2001 did not use the mosque for
his meetings, but a nearby apartment instead.76 Since
then, Muslim-Americans in Buffalo have not left this to
chance, as one community leader explained (see “We
Monitor Our Masjids,” previous page).
On at least one occasion, self-policing by Muslim-
Americans apparently interfered with law enforcement
intelligence operations. In 2007, the Islamic Center of
Irvine, California, won a temporary restraining order
barring Craig Monteilh from the mosque. Monteilh
had worried mosque officials by advocating violence
and attempting to recruit congregants for potential
terrorist plots. Monteilh subsequently claimed to have
been an informant for the FBI. While the FBI did not
confirm this claim, the Bureau relied on Monteilh’s tes-
timony at a bail hearing for a Muslim-American from
the mosque who was charged with immigration viola-
tions.77 This case was publicized widely among Mus-
lim-Americans in early 2009 when Monteilh went public
with his claims, and it served to confirm suspicions
among many Muslim-Americans that government in-
formants are widespread in mosques around the
country. 
After another incident in 2009, in which a government
informant recruited four Muslim-Americans in Newburgh,
New York, and allegedly plotted with them to bomb a
synagogue in the Bronx, the imam of the Newburgh
mosque went on a national speaking tour to warn
Muslims to be on the look-out for entrapment. A flyer
advertising one of his appearances stated, “He is en-
couraging Muslims to avoid entrapment by reporting
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any suspicious and radical talk heard in their presence
to the authorities.”
While some of the motivation for self-policing by
Muslim-Americans is clearly self-preservation—not
wanting to be caught up in a sting operation or be as-
sociated with anybody who is causing trouble—self-
policing does not appear to be reducible simply to
strategic calculations of self-interest. In addition to
anxiety that another act of terrorism in the U.S. could
result in collective punishment against all Muslim-Amer-
icans, our respondents also cite ethical principles and
sacred sources when speaking of self-policing, suggesting
that this is simply proper religious comportment.
3. COMMUNITY-BUILDING
Of Muslim-Americans who have engaged in terrorist
violence since September 11, 2001, there is no
single pattern concerning the extent to which the
were integrated into their communities. Some of
them were loners who had little connection to
any community at all; some had deeper connections
abroad than locally; and some had stronger ties
with a handful of buddies than with their community
as a whole; and finally, some, like the Lackawanna
Six, were well known and turned in by a community
member. In the case of the Muslims from North
Carolina indicted in 2009, it appears that the indi-
viduals were initially integrated into the community,
but as they radicalized, they left their masjids and
became more isolated.
In order for Muslim-American communities to bring
collective pressure on individuals inclined to radicalize,
they must draw those individuals into the organizations
and social networks that counter radical beliefs, such
as mosques, Islamic centers, religious bookstores, ethnic
[S]elf-policing does not appear to be
reducible simply to strategic calculations
of self-interest 
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institutions, civil rights organizations, and other communal
associations that draw Muslim-Americans together.
This image runs counter to some of the concerns
expressed by non-Muslim Americans about Islamic or-
ganizations in the United States, which they perceive
are channels for radicalization. Our evidence suggests
the opposite: Muslim-American community-building is
a significant factor in the prevention of radicalization. 
Muslim-American community-building includes a
variety of activities, some openly religious and some
not, such as the following: 
• Religious: Mosques, Islamic centers, lectures. 
• Athletic: Basketball tournaments, soccer leagues. 
• Cultural: Fashion shows, religious festivals,
ethnic festivals, national-heritage holidays such
as Pakistan Independence Day  and Iranian
New Year. 
• Social: Charity events, dances, mixers. 
• Organizational: Local, regional, and national
associations and conferences, training sessions. 
• Political: Lobbying, media-relations, voter-reg-
istration, electoral campaigns. 
Our interview respondents and almost all observers
agree that Muslim-Americans have stepped up com-
munity-building in all forms over the past two decades,
especially since 9/11. 
The direct goal of these activities is not to prevent
radicalization, though that appears to have been an
unintended outcome. Instead, these activities are in-
tended to strengthen Muslim-American communities
and serve community goals, which include protecting
Muslim-Americans’ rights, deepening community mem-
bers’ faith, and spreading the message of Islam to
non-Muslims.
Of particular concern to Muslim-Americans in com-
munity-building activities are Muslim-American youth.
Many Muslim-American adults, both immigrants and
U.S.-born, express concern that Muslim youths may
drift away from their Islamic identity due to immersion
in mainstream American culture. One young man de-
scribed this as an existential problem that threatens
the survival of Muslim-American communities.
For me, from my perspective, growing up
in public school, you tend to lose your
identity and assimilate, a lot of people as-
similate, especially when you’re a minority.
I remember growing up, in school, there
were some Muslims that didn’t act like they’re
Muslims, it was like, you wanted to fit in. A
lot of people wanted to assimilate and fit it
and not act according to what their religion
is. I’ve even seen some eat pork -- eat pep-
peronis [on their pizza], wouldn’t even pull
them off. ... 
You’re dealing with a lot of ignorant people,
a lot of people who don’t grow up with
mothers and fathers, a lot of people who
don’t even know their fathers. So the way
they act, and the way that the media ampli-
fies the ignorance—all of a sudden, you may
have two parents who love you and treat
The direct goal of these activities is not
to prevent radicalization, though that appears to
have been an unintended outcome
you with respect and show you how to be
a man, but you want to be out there with
your pants hanging down on your butt just
so you fit in, you know.78
According to another young Muslim-American, ad-
dressing these influences is a higher priority than ad-
dressing the potential of radicalization.
I don’t think in [our] community we’ll have
anything to worry about [radicalization]. As
a matter of fact, their greater concern is
people losing faith in religion. The young
generation is getting hooked on drugs, get-
ting drunk, getting in car crashes—that’s
happened a lot, so I think that’s more of
their concern. ... I think that our community
is more trying to combat youth looking at
porn sites than radical Islam sites. ... 
What the mosque has been trying to do is
really focus on the youth, really focus on
letting them have a place where they can
be, where people in this situation don’t have
to be in a particular socio-economic status,
everything is open, everything is free—try to
unite them on things that they can, like
playing basketball, going on trips, things that
the mosque pays for, so that they won’t have
to, [things like] youth centers.79
At the same time, the student observed, these
mosque-sponsored activities also serve to reduce alien-
ation in rare cases of potential radicalization. 
The community is prepared to deal with
[this], because there have been like two or
three instances, and they would deal with
it in the same way [as youths who are
looking at porn sites]. They would try to
take this person aside, talk to them, try to
incorporate them into the community at-
mosphere, try to get them involved in more
youth activities in the community. 
Muslim-Americans’ community-building activities
also focus on recent immigrants. Some long-time resi-
dents, as well as some American-born Muslims, view
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These mosque-sponsored youth activities 
also serve to reduce alienation 
in rare cases of potential radicalization
recent immigrants as less educated and less familiar
with American institutions than immigrants from a
generation ago.
We have disintegrated, unfortunately, as
time went on, because, unfortunately, we
were a lot better 50 years ago, 40 years
ago. We were a small group, most of us
were educated—we came here as students,
going to universities. We understood that
Islam, the community, was our insurance.
When somebody [in your family] died, some-
body was going to help you. When some-
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body got married, when somebody got sick,
you knew somebody was going to help
you. Now, unfortunately, we’ve got a lot
of—I’m not bad-mouthing them—but we’ve
got a lot of uneducated people coming
from countries which are divided, and when
they came, they brought their problems to
us.80
I feel that there are lots of children that
come from low-income families [of immi-
grants]. ... Their parents have very little
knowledge of the American system, of the
language, of the culture, and they themselves
have a very low education level, no matter
what they may have signed [on the immi-
gration forms saying] that they have a bach-
elor’s [degree], but it’s really nothing close
to the bachelor’s you achieve in this country.
They are basically semi-literate. They work
very long hours, and the children in the
meantime are being neglected, they are
facing dangers the parents have no idea
about. They are going to a school system
they don’t understand they have a say in,
they can question the problems. For example,
a very simple example, many of them don’t
even know that there is something called a
parent-teacher conference.81
A lot of immigrant Muslims—they have some
habits and tendencies that don’t always
mesh well with American Muslims, and
whether that’s American as in African-Amer-
ican or Caucasian-American, or whether
that’s even American-born Muslim, period,
you see a clash. And I think we’re trying to
step outside the box, in terms of, for example,
immigrant Muslims are suspicious of law
enforcement. Well, we have to be a little
more pro-active in terms of saying, well,
these are the people that are brought in to
serve us.82
In a process of Muslim-led assimilation that aims to
preserve religious faith, these respondents and others
work to include newer immigrants in Muslim-American
institutions and help them to navigate the legal system,
the schools, and unfamiliar cultural phenomena. The
case of the approximately 20 young men from Min-
neapolis who traveled to Somali to join the Shabaab
demonstrates how immigrant assimilation efforts have
not always been successful and how those efforts
need to be strengthened, especially in communities
isolated by language, culture, and economics.
In addition to acculturating its youth and new im-
migrants, Muslim-American community-building also
incorporates ex-convicts, especially men who converted
to Islam while in prison. Since they have only experienced
Islamic life while incarcerated, these new Muslims have
never attended a mosque or joined a Muslim celebration,
and they have little idea of what it means to maintain
a Muslim identity outside of prison.83 Muslim-Americans
have worked to integrate these people into their com-
“I think we’re trying to step outside the box ... 
[about how] immigrant Muslims 
are suspicious of law enforcement.”
munities. One national organization, the Muslim Alliance
in North America, has made this one of its top priorities;
this group runs workshops to help local groups train
staff and develop programs that support Muslim-Amer-
ican prisoners before and after their release.84 In the
Buffalo area, a local organization has extensive experience
with this work.
We try to build in the whole idea of reentry
throughout their incarceration, and when
they come out, we try to continue it—in
other words, how to be a good father, how
to be a good husband, how to be a pro-
ductive community member, how to obtain
a job, how to prepare for employment,
those are the kinds of things we try to
teach. We try to hold them accountable for
their Islam, most importantly, because as a
prisoner, as an inmate, it’s easy to be a good
Muslim in there, because if you don’t, the
other guys, they might beat you up or some-
thing. There is social pressure on you. But
when you come out here, nobody really
cares if you don’t go to a jum‘a [Friday
prayer]. So if you’re not strong enough to
be the Muslim that’s in your heart, that’s in
your head, then you might become another
statistic in terms of recidivism.85
A Muslim-American leader in North Carolina said
that he and his mosque directly confront the hostility
that some African-American ex-convicts express toward
white America. 
It’s mainly because of the black experience,
not the Islamic experience, because they
are relatively new to Islam—they think that
America is against African-Americans, and
they say, well, America is against Muslims,
so they try to put those two together. They
try to use their feelings of being mistreated
and discriminated against by America to
say “Death to America,” that type of thing. 
We’ve been very, very firm with people who
come here, to this mosque. We make it very
clear to them what our expectations are,
this is the behavior we expect from you,
and let it be known that that kind of think-
ing—that America is a great satan, because
America is “the Beast,” as some black radical
might say—is not welcome. Now you have
a choice to come integrate into society, and
we will help you.86
The primary goal of this outreach is to encourage
Islamic piety, but a side effect, as one Muslim-American
leader in Seattle noted, is to counteract potentially
radical visions of Islam that some prisoners may have
been exposed to.  
Some of them are educated over the internet.
... They have their way of thinking and un-
derstanding things, so we have tried to tell
them to work on the basics and the spiritual
side. Some of them understand this. I think
by visiting them, they appreciate that. Oth-
erwise, they will become internet scholars,
which is dangerous for the future. 
I personally went for a haircut, and met this
person who had been released from prison,
telling people that you have to make hijra
[emigrate] from this country. I said to him,
“Why are you telling people this?” Then,
after a few years, I met him again, and he
said, “Now I know why you said that.” He
had a pretty radical view. I tried to make
him understand, but I don’t think at that
time he understood me. Afterwards, he un-
derstood.87
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“That kind of thinking—
that America is a great satan ...—
is not welcome.”
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Of special interest is this discussion of Muslim-
American community building are the social isolates—
loners, sometimes struggling with mental problems—
who are not active participants in communal life. Some
Muslim-Americans who have radicalized since 9/11 to
become terrorists appear to fit this description. In North
Carolina, for example, Mohammad Taheri-Azar—who
drove his car through campus in March 2006, trying to
run people over to avenge U.S. foreign policies toward
Muslims—had almost no connection with other Mus-
lim-Americans. He had occasionally attended meetings
of the Muslim Students Association at the University of
North Carolina in Chapel Hill, but, according to a fellow
student, he did not feel welcome there. As a result,
Taheri-Azar “self-excluded himself.” “[Other Muslim-
American students] thought he was crazy from the be-
ginning. ... People would avoid him, but at the same
time, he avoided others.”88 The local police and the FBI
interviewed a variety of people who had known him over
the years, apparently concluding that none of them had
any foreknowledge of his plot. According to Taheri-Azar
himself, in letters written from jail while he awaited trial,
he was so isolated at the time of his plot that he could
not produce even three friends to attest to his good
moral character on a handgun permit application.89
Several of our interview respondents said that their
communities were reaching out to socially isolated in-
dividuals to ensure that they did not engage in negative
behaviors. “When you don’t get engaged in positive
stuff, you’re going to get engaged in self-defeating
stuff,” a community activist in North Carolina told us.
“A lot of messages were given out: Do your own thing,
don’t get engaged, there is no hope. ... Disengage-
ment—I don’t think it has led to much radical action, it
has led mainly to self-defeating action, by making this
society or this community seem to be an unacceptable
community.”90
More than a year prior to Taheri-Azar’s attack, one
of the largest Islamic organizations in North Carolina
had partnered with public-health students and faculty
from the University of North Carolina to assess the
major issues facing the local Muslim-American com-
munity, and had concluded, among other things, that
one priority was the provision of more counseling
services for community members who were struggling
with social, financial, or psychological difficulties.91
“Everything you see in American society is there [in
Muslim-American communities],” the professor super-
vising the project told us. Four years after the report
was completed, local Muslim American organizations
now had several psychologists on staff, but there was
more to be done. “We still as a community need to de-
velop that competence.”92
It is worth noting a trend that runs counter to
Muslim-American community-building efforts: the im-
pulse to expel potential trouble-makers from community
organizations. This trend grows out of the community’s
desire to self-police, to protect its members from the
actions of the troublesome individual or from suspicion
or backlash if the individual were to break any laws.
Several of our respondents noted that the recent
climate of heightened security concerns has made
some people wary of being associated in any way
with individuals who might be the focus of law en-
forcement operations. These concerns undermine the
social connections that might allow the community to
moderate or, in worst case scenarios, monitor individuals
who express radical views. In the words of one re-
spondent, “I think the FBI needs to make it very clear
that by you helping us combat terrorism, you will not
be harmed.”93
Their communities were reaching out to 
socially isolated individuals to ensure that they 
did not engage in negative behaviors
4. POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
A further set of efforts that Muslim-Americans have
undertaken since September 11, 2001, involve
participation in the democratic politics of the United
States. As with other activities of Muslim-American
communities, the primary goal is not preventing
radicalization, but is, instead, the defense of the
rights and interests of Muslim-Americans in a
political environment that they experience as threat-
ening. Nonetheless, this political mobilization has
the effect of channeling grievances into democratic
forums and integrating Muslim-Americans into the
democratic system.
This pattern follows in the footsteps of other minority
and immigrant groups in the United States, such as
the Irish in the mid-19th century, Jews in the early
20th century, and African-Americans in the mid-20th
century. Muslim-Americans often liken their current
situation to the trajectory of these other groups. At
times the analogy is with the African-Americans. “The
civil rights movement succeeded because all African-
Americans were united in their demand for constitutional
rights,” one national Muslim-American organization
emphasized in a call to Muslims to involve themselves
in electoral politics. “Given our low level of political en-
gagement preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we
found very few friends in the government in the after-
math of the 9/11, the legacy of which is still felt
today.”94 At other times, the analogy is with Irish-
Americans, who are also classified as white by the U.S.
Census, but who have historically been considered
non-white and suffered racial discrimination.95 Some
Muslim-Americans have also drawn an analogy with
Jewish-Americans, who have achieved a significant
role in U.S. politics despite their small numbers.96
One avenue for Muslim-American political partici-
pation draws directly on the model of civil rights activism
of other groups, such as the NAACP. The most famous
of this sort of organization, the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR), issues a steady stream of press
releases and annual reports that publicize and denounce
hate crimes and other instances of discrimination
against Muslim-Americans.97 The Council contacts gov-
ernment officials to make sure that anti-discriminatory
laws are passed and enforced, works with attorneys
to bring lawsuits on behalf of Muslim-Americans who
have suffered discrimination, and holds workshops
around the country to train Muslim-Americans to
defend their rights. In a recent CAIR newsletter, leaders
linked these activities directly to the legacy of other civil
rights movements in the United States: 
Muslim-Americans recognize that the predica-
ment they are in today is not isolated but
lies within a larger context of civil rights
struggles in America. Muslim-Americans are
not the first group to face widespread prej-
udice and systemic discrimination. Jewish,
Hispanic and Japanese-Americans have had
their share of injustices leveled against them.
And no other community has come close
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Political mobilization has the effect 
of channeling grievances 
into democratic forums
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to the long-standing suffering of the African-
American community. Now, Muslim-Ameri-
cans are among those at the forefront of
the civil rights movement. This movement
asks for a society subject to the rigor of law,
governed by a system of transparency and
accountability wherein the constitution ap-
plies to all equally.98
In addition, Muslim-American organizations have
become increasingly active in electoral politics. Several
Muslim-American groups have followed the example
of other minority groups, conducting voter-registration
drives and issue-advocacy campaigns at the state and
national levels.  Muslim-Americans engaged in an un-
precedented level of political activity during the presidential
election season of 2008.99
The efforts of national organizations are supple-
mented by those of local Muslim-American groups. In
keeping with the quintessentially American pattern of
civil-society associations, these groups have proliferated
to the point that they must compete with one another
for the support of Muslim-American communities. This
sometimes leads to acrimony, but it also teaches
pluralism and coalition-building. These groups have
come together to support Muslim-American candidates,
We asked the attorney, what can we do? And he
said, “Listen, this society is built on the power of
two things. Money and politics. You already have
the money, because you hired me as an attorney
and you pay me very well, and I will earn it. But
the other thing, politics—the power of voters over
the legislators—you don’t have this.” ...   
It took us about one and a half years to go
through this whole process, on that advice. And of
course, we could not get involved, because we are a
non-profit organization, so we established—the
community, not me— ... a political organization to
practice our voting process. And it was very success-
ful, with the blessing of Allah. ...   
The next voting process was in November, and
both of those two guys [on the city council who had
opposed the mosque expansion] were completely
out, and the one who had really supported our
project came into office. And now it was very clear.
... We are citizens. We pay the same taxes as other
people, but our shortcoming was that we were not
voting. But when we had that organized effort, it
was very successful. ...   
Interviewer: Just a few years ago, I used to hear
some Muslims say that involvement in politics is not
something they should do, because this is a non-
Muslim country.  
That is exactly what we used to say, but what we
do today—theoretically, it is very easy
to say [avoid political involvement], but
practically, we consider Islam as a dy-
namic faith. You have no case in your
life for which Islam doesn’t have an an-
swer. Even Ibn Taymiyya, one of the
great Islamic scholars at the time of the Mongols ...
gave a very good answer [to this question of politi-
cal involvement in non-Muslim governments]. He
said, “Of course, originally, you should not. But in
this case, if you find yourself taking that position,
reducing the harm to the public, now it has become
not only lawful but an obligation, an Islamic obliga-
tion. ... I delivered a khutba [sermon] on these is-
sues at that time, it was very good. Yes, this is not
allowed in the beginning, but when we are facing
some type of evil or harm, what can you do? And
that is really the dynamic nature of our shari‘a. ... 
I still look at it like we still are in the beginning
stages. We are not being organized properly in the
political arena. Because really, we are part of this
society, we are citizens. What will harm them, will
harm us, and sometimes what will harm them
harms us first. So how can I isolate myself from the
entire society?110
What Will Harm Them, Will Harm Us
some of whom have been elected to office in non-
Muslim-majority districts, including a state senator in
North Carolina, a city councilor in Houston, and school
board members in the Buffalo region and elsewhere.
Perhaps more importantly, Muslim-Americans have
mobilized around local issues that they consider serious
grievances for their affected communities. 
In North Carolina, for example, a mosque sought a
building permit to expand to accommodate the growing
Muslim-American population in the region. Two city
council members blocked the permit. The imam did
not believe that it was religiously justified for Muslims
to participate politically in a non-Muslim country, but a
conversation with the mosque’s attorney changed his
mind, and he later drew on Islamic jurisprudence to
bolster this position (see “What Will Harm Them, Will
Harm Us,” previous page). In the Buffalo area, where
Muslim-Americans have been a significant presence
for several generations, political participation has his-
torically been limited, but that is changing. One young
man, a third-generation Yemeni-American, described
his Muslim-American identity and the beginnings of
political involvement at the local level, where the most
pressing issues involve potholes and schools (see “We
Are Not Against America,” this page). In Seattle, as
well, political involvement is only just emerging. One
community leader identified lobbying as the primary
outlet for these efforts.
Most Muslims are scared stiff. Most Muslims
are first-generation Muslims who come from
the old country, wherever that is. We come
from a country that is a dictatorship, that is
a tyranny and a despotism. You raise your
head in that country and they will whack
your head off. And we come to this country
and we still think that if we say anything,
we’ll get our heads whacked off. So most
of us keep our heads down, we go to work,
we come back, we pretend that nothing is
happening, hoping that nothing will happen.
A few of us make the noises. A few of us
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We are not against the government. We are
not against America. We look at ourselves as
part of the American people. We want to help
this country because this is the country we live
in. ... My grandfather came to the United States
in the 40s. I’m here because he came here. And
believe it or not, there were two instances after
9/11 where somebody told me, “Go back to
your country.” I am in my country! If I want to
go somewhere else, I have to get a visa from
there. For example, if I wanted to go to Yemen.
This is my country. Where do you want me to
go?  Once I heard this from a guy who got out
of his car and wanted to fight me. “I’m probably
more American than you. Probably you’re sec-
ond generation. I’m third generation!” But the
government is not helping—it’s worsening the
situation by fostering the impression that Islam
is associated with terrorism. ...
Interviewer: Would you say that local gov-
ernment pays attention to your community’s
voices? 
They do, but they don’t respond to it. Like,
we have a street here, if you drive down one
these roads here, 90 percent of that street is
Muslim-owned houses, working Americans, tax-
payers, and we want that street fixed. I mean,
it’s like a roller coaster. We invited county au-
thorities and housing people, and they say, “Oh
yeah, we’ll take care of it.” But there is delay af-
ter delay after delay.  However, you see in other
places, where the majority are white, the streets
get repaired over and over and over. 
Interviewer: I wonder, somebody might say
maybe it’s time for you to elect a local politician
from your community.
I don’t know. We have currently two people
that we elected to the school board last year, be-
cause we were concerned about education of
our children. That was our focus. We pushed for
these two people. We gathered behind them
and elected them to the school board, one in
the high school and one on the middle school.
So we try to get involved.111
We Are Not Against America
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are going around talking to decision-makers
and saying, “You can’t do this.”
Interviewer: Do you think these voices are
effective?
Oh, yes, absolutely. If they weren’t effective, I
would give it up. Just one major accomplish-
ment we had was a meeting with the police
chief. ... Our problem is: I don’t mind if our
law enforcement people are trained about
religion, so long as that course is about religion
and more than one religion is being discussed
there. I don’t mind if law enforcement is being
trained about terrorism. They should be trained
about terrorism and criminal behavior. Our
problem is: You cannot be training any law
enforcment, or anybody really, in criminal be-
havior and one race, religion, or national
origin in the same class. Because without
saying it, what you’re saying is, “Let’s talk
about terrorism, and let’s talk about Islam,”
and the connection is made. You don’t have
to say there is a connection. And he agreed
completely. He issued a memo just a couple
of weeks ago saying to his senior staff, Please
don’t approve courses that teach criminal be-
havior and a race, religion, or ethnic group at
the same time.100
These mechanisms for political representation enable
the experience of discrimination and other grievances
to be directed toward the government, where they
can be addressed. Such political self-assertion treats
democracy as part of the solution, not part of the
problem. Some Muslim-Americans express impatience
with these solutions, just as some African-Americans
expressed impatience with the civil rights movement in
the 1960s. Now, as then, the question is whether
political action will yield sufficient returns to keep
militancy at bay.
5. IDENTITY POLITICS
The expression of a Muslim-American identity has
taken on an increasingly assertive tone in the years
since the 9/11 attacks. This trend has taken the form
of young women wearing headscarves at political
rallies, young men growing beards as an embodiment
of their faith, workers in various industries claiming
the right to take breaks for prayers; parents sending
their children to Islamic schools, and other public ex-
pressions of Islamic piety.
While some observers are concerned that heightened
expressions of Muslim-American piety may be a sign
of impending radicalization, there is evidence to the
contrary. The Pew Research Center’s 2007 survey of
Muslim-Americans found that respondents who said
religion was very important in their lives were one-
third less likely than other respondents to consider
attacks on civilians to be sometimes or often justified
“in order to defend Islam from its enemies.”101 (Justifi-
cations of these attacks were very unlikely—under 10
percent—among both sets of Muslim-American re-
spondents. By way of comparison, according to a sep-
arate poll of a national sample, 24 percent of Americans
considered “bombing and other types of attacks in-
tentionally aimed at civilians” to be sometimes or often
justified.)102
Muslim-American identity is itself a product of Amer-
icanization. For generations, Muslims in the United
States were not “Muslim-American”—rather, they iden-
tified themselves by ethnicity, such as Arab or Tatar.
While some observers are concerned that heightened 
expressions of Muslim-American piety may be a sign of 
impending radicalization, there is evidence to the contrary
With the emergence of hyphenated American identities
in the 1960s, many Muslims in the U.S. also adopted
hyphenated identities along ethnic lines, such as Arab-
American. Only since 9/11, spurred by national security
programs, has “Muslim-American” become a popular
self-designation. Like other recently invented pan-
ethnic identities in the U.S., such as Hispanic-American
and Asian-American, Muslim-American identity was
promoted in part by a political movement that sought
to aggregate sub-groups in order to increase visibility
and influence. The organizations that have taken this
name in their title or mission statements, such as the
Muslim American Society, are among the leaders in
mobilizing their constituency for political participation.
The assumption of a Muslim-American identity may
have resonated in part because it reflects the new
social configuration of Islam in the United States. Over
the past several decades, immigration and conversion
have turned Muslim communities into far more multi-
ethnic sites than the homogenous enclaves of a gen-
eration ago. According to a survey of more than 400
mosques in 2000, one third had no majority of partici-
pants from any single ethnic group.103 Immigrants
from numerous countries come to know one another
far more than they would have in their home countries,
creating a new Islamic identity that is distinct from the
narrower sense of ethnic identity, as described by one
young Muslim-American leader:
I think the cultural traditions or the cultural
norms largely have been almost dropped
from the youth generation, but many of
the youth have held on to their Islamic iden-
tity, and maybe—I don’t want to say aban-
doned—they have given their [ethnic] her-
itage or their lineage less importance. But
at the same time many youth have given
their Islamic identity more importance. So
you’ll find a lot of youth who are good
American Muslims, who are very American
by their culture, by their norms, but who
still at the same time hold on to their Islamic
identities. ...
[Local institutions] play an important role
in differentiating between what is something
that we as Muslims can’t give up and what
is something that is cultural and isn’t neces-
sarily part of the religion. For me, as a
Muslim, to give up part of my religion is un-
acceptable to me, but for me to give up a
certain custom that my family has held or
that people from Egypt do isn’t as big a
deal.104
An immigrant in Seattle noticed the same phe-
nomenon with his American-born children:
I can tell you about my kids, they like to
think of [themselves as] mainstream Ameri-
cans. They are American Muslims. I’m not
sure about other families, but my family,
that’s how I see them. They don’t want to
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Only since 9/11, spurred by national security 
programs, has “Muslim-American” become 
a popular self-designation.
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associate themselves with any ethnic group
per se. They don’t want to think of Muslims
as ethnic people. Islam is a faith, it’s a religion,
there is no specific ethnic group that is as-
sociated with it. There are all kinds of Muslims.
So they think of themselves as Americans
and Muslims.105
This pan-ethnic Muslim-American identity has deep-
roots in Islamic history, originating in debates in the
first generations of Islam over whether non-Arabs could
be considered full Muslims. Today, many Islamic groups,
including terrorist groups, claim to speak on behalf of
the entire umma, the global community of Muslims.
However, the pan-ethnic identity of Muslim-Americans
serves to undermine terrorism by emphasizing the
compatibility of Muslim-ness and American-ness. These
are not two civilizations on a crash course, but instead
two civilizations overlapping and melding. A recent
book offers an outspoken vision of this double identity: 
This anthology is about women who don’t
remember a time when they weren’t both
American and Muslim. ... We wore Underoos
and watched MTV. We know juz ‘amma
(the final thirtieth [chapter] of the Qur’an)
and Michael Jackson’s Thriller by heart. We
played Atari and Game Boy and competed
in Qur’anic recitation competitions. As we
enter our twenties, thirties, and forties we
have settled into the American Muslim iden-
tity that we’ve pioneered.106
One of our respondents, a religiously conservative
young man who was born and raised in New York
State, echoed this double identity, drawing out its im-
plications as a bulwark against radicalization:  
Muslims who grow up in this country, who
know Americans and who know America,
who consider themselves American—I con-
sider myself American, my kid will be an
American. Why would he hate himself? ...
See, people would look at me and they’d
think, this guy is a radical, and I understand
how they would come up with that conclu-
sion, because they look at what they see
on TV and they look at me and they put
two and two together. So I hope to see a
Muslim revival among Muslims and among
non-Muslims in the United States. I hope to
see more Muslims practicing Islam and proud
of their Islam. ... I’d like to  see a religious
revival among American Muslims, but that
doesn’t mean radicalization, it doesn’t mean
that they are going to hate America and
everything that we as Americans stand for.107
Our conclusion is that Muslim-Americans are be-
coming more American, not less American, as they en-
gage in identity politics. The formation of Muslim-
American Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops is a powerful
example of this process. On one hand, these groups
are a form of separatism, marking Muslim-American
youths as distinct from other American children. But
the fact that these groups emerged within the American
scouting movement is a sign that they are embracing,
not rejecting, their American-ness. So far as we can
find, no Muslim-American scout has ever engaged in
an act of terrorism—and we feel it is a safe bet to
predict that none ever will. 
Muslim-Americans are becoming more American, 
not less American, 
as they engage in identity politics
This research project found that Muslim-American
communities strongly reject radical jihadi ideology,
are eager to contribute to the national counterter-
rorism effort, and are fiercely committed to inte-
gration within the mainstream of American social
and economic life. As explained in Part 2 of this re-
port, Muslim-American communities are taking a
variety of positive steps that help prevent radical-
ization within their communities: 1) they consistently
denounce terrorism directed at the United States;
2) they engage in self-policing by prohibiting radical
sermons in their mosques and taking action against
radical views expressed by outsiders or community
members; 3) they are building strong institutions
within their communities to direct their youth in a
positive direction; 4) they are addressing their
grievances through political mobilization; and 5)
they are emphasizing their identity as Muslim-
Americans. In addition, Muslim-Americans have
developed strong working relationships with federal
and local law enforcement agencies. 
Nonetheless, there is an uneasy tension in the rela-
tionship between Muslim-Americans and other Amer-
icans that causes concern. Whether it is from public
opinion polls, media coverage, commentary by angry
voices on the Internet and talk radio, or portrayals of
Muslims in popular culture, Muslim-Americans sense
an element of hostility towards both Islam and Muslims
emanating from at least a portion of American society.
Also, while Muslim-Americans accept the need for en-
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hanced security measures, they also perceive many
government counterterrorism, security, and immigration
policies to be unfair and discriminatory in their application
to Muslims-Americans. Finally, they have many dis-
agreements with American foreign policy. These dis-
agreements have been present for many decades, but
due to 9/11 and subsequent events over the past
eight years in the United States, the Middle East, and
South Asia, these issues have become more relevant
and the schisms more intense. 
The presence of these tensions does not, in our
view, imply widespread radicalization among Muslim-
Americans or the potential for widespread radicalization
in the future. However, isolated instances of radicalization
may continue to occur in the corners of society because
small groups or individuals who are vulnerable to radi-
calization or who are socially isolated may misinterpret
and magnify the discontent and unease among main-
stream Muslim-Americans. 
Our recommendations, therefore, have two goals:
building on the successes of Muslim-American com-
munities that are associated with low levels of radical-
ization in the United States and creating a more positive
environment for Muslim-Americans so their anti-radi-
calization measures will continue to be effective. 
1. Encourage Political Mobilization
The most significant positive trend we have identified
is the increased political mobilization of Muslim-Amer-
icans. Participation of Muslim-Americans in political life
The most significant positive trend 
... is the increased 
political mobilization of Muslim-Americans
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has a number of positive impacts: 1) grievances are
brought into the public sphere and clearly articulated
so they do not fester and deepen, 2) disputes are
resolved through debate, compromise, and routine
political procedures, and 3) political mobilization leads
to ever-increasing numbers of Muslim-American leaders
speaking responsibly about difficult issues on both the
national and international stages. The political mobi-
lization of Muslim-Americans is not only a beneficial
development in terms of stunting domestic radicalization,
but it also demonstrates to Muslims around the world
that Muslims do have a voice in America and are
working to resolve their grievances through peaceful,
democratic means. 
We believe that public officials should encourage
the continued political mobilization of Muslim-American
communities and take steps to further integrate Mus-
lim-Americans and Muslim-American organizations into
American political life. Both major political parties should
organize to actively seek the Muslim-American vote as
they do with other ethnic and religious groups. Public
officials should attend events at mosques as they do
at churches and synagogues. Muslim-American com-
munity groups should be invited to participate in com-
munity forums and events. It will be beneficial if these
activities take place at both the national and local
levels of government. We believe it is in our national
security interest for members of both parties to appear
publicly with Muslim leaders, attend events with
Muslims, attend services at mosques, and promote
Muslim candidates in elections.
President Obama has continued the tradition of
holding an Iftar dinner at the White House which is a
positive and important statement. He should make a
special effort to hold other events with Muslim-
Americans to address the disappointment many felt
during the presidential campaign, in which the false
claim that he is a Muslim was used by some as a
political weapon and perceived as a political vulnerability. 
Inclusion of Muslim-American organizations in our
political system is also important and needs to be en-
couraged. We neither support nor oppose the agendas
of Muslim-American organizations; we merely note
that such groups play a valuable role in our political
system and are one avenue for individuals to express
themselves and gain representation for their views.
2. Promote Public Denunciations of Violence
Public opinion polls in the United States suggest
that a significant minority of Americans are highly sus-
picious of Muslim-Americans and seemingly unaware
of the consistent and strong public denunciations of
violence by Muslim-American organizations and leaders. 
We believe that these denunciations of violence are
an important reflection of Muslim-American opinion
and values. Muslim organizations at all levels should
continue to issue these denunciations following incidents
here or abroad, even to the point of redundancy, and
vigorously publicize them. We recommend that local
organizations and mosques do so as well. Public
officials, who often comment on terrorism-related inci-
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dents or arrests, should include these denunciations
from Muslim-Americans in their commentary. The media
should routinely include these denunciations as part
of their coverage. 
3.  Reinforce Self-Policing Efforts by Improv-
ing the Relationship Between Law Enforce-
ment and Muslim-American Communities
This project identified initiatives by Muslim-Americans
to police their own communities against radicalization.
These efforts can take many forms. In one instance,
mosque officials worked with law enforcement to
identify a wayward youth vulnerable to radicalization,
bring him back into the community, and assist him to-
ward a stable, productive future. There are also examples,
often underreported or ignored by the press, where
Muslim-Americans provided information to law en-
forcement that led to surveillance, arrests, and prose-
cutions. On other occasions, individuals expressing
radical ideas have simply been purged, thrown out of
their mosques and rejected by the broader community. 
The appropriate course of action to be taken when
evidence is uncovered of possible radicalization will of
course vary from case to case. There are costs and
benefits to each of these different approaches. In
general terms, however, we propose that Muslim-
American communities and law enforcement agencies
cooperate more closely to overcome mutual suspicions
and achieve common goals. This will require affirmative
steps  by both Muslim-Americans and law enforcement,
as well as renewed pathways for working together.
For their part, Muslim-American communities must
recognize that simply purging radicalized individuals
from their communities is not sufficient. Such action
may push these individuals even further away from
mainstream thought, accelerate the radicalization
process, and possibly lead to violence. Muslim-American
leaders must promote a culture where cooperation
with law enforcement is not only accepted, but perceived
as a duty, to both the Muslim-American community
and the broader American public. In order to foster
such cooperation, law enforcement must demonstrate
that it is capable of dealing with the problem of radi-
calization in a proportionate and sensitive manner that
does not always result in arrest and prosecution. It is a
far better result from all perspectives if individuals
heading towards radicalization can be—rather than
arrested and prosecuted—deterred from their actions
and have their lives re-directed. Law enforcement and
Muslim-American communities need to discuss the
type of interventions that might lead to such results
and develop guidelines for determining when  community
intervention might be appropriate.
A second source of tension is the perception by
Muslim-Americans that law enforcement has aggressively
and inappropriately used informants in their communities
on counterterrorism cases.   Law enforcement agencies
should recognize that these tactics may be counter-
productive if the use of informants causes long-term
harm to their relationship with Muslim-American com-
munities. Muslim-Americans, for their part, should un-
derstand that the use of informants is an accepted,
traditional law enforcement practice and may be nec-
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essary in appropriate cases to gather evidence on indi-
viduals who are a potential danger.
To address this issue, we propose a candid dialogue
between law enforcement and Muslim-American com-
munities about the handling of criminal cases and the
use of informants. Law enforcement agencies should
develop policies for when the use of informants in
Muslim-American communities is appropriate and
discuss these policies openly with community leaders.
For this dialogue to be productive, Muslim-Americans
must acknowledge that there is a continuing, albeit
low level, problem of radicalization in their community.
They need to be vigilant in their self-policing and
continue to build a trusting relationship with law en-
forcement, which at times may require them to identify
individuals within their community as deserving of law
enforcement scrutiny. Turning a blind eye towards po-
tential problems is a counterproductive and potentially
dangerous path. An open dialogue on a full range of
issues will help to reinforce the positive self-policing
efforts by Muslim-Americans that we have identified in
this project.
Besides resolving grievances over use of law en-
forcement tactics, other positive steps can be taken to
build a stronger relationship between law enforcement
agencies and Muslim-American communities. 
First, the relationship can be strengthened and so-
lidified by hiring more Muslim law enforcement officers.
A full range of affirmative steps need to be taken to
accomplish this task, including recruiting at schools in
predominantly Muslim areas and institutions.
Second, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies
should increase their outreach efforts, which, in general,
have been received positively. These agencies, however,
must grasp the diversity of social groups within Mus-
lim-American communities. Current efforts appear to
focus centrally on mosques, but there is no single
point of access to the Muslim-American community.
Ethnic associations, neighborhood groups, youth
groups, women’s organizations, and other sorts of
social organizations are also representatives of Mus-
lim-American communities. These communities are not
defined by their faith alone. Successful programs such
as the FBI’s Bridges Program and Citizen’s Academy
should be expanded. We found positive reactions to
these programs in Buffalo and other locations, and we
recommend that similar programs be made available
nationally.
Third, law enforcement agencies should recognize
the diversity of ethnicities within Muslim-American-
communities, which ranges across many nationalities,
from Arab, to African-American, to recent Chinese-
Muslim immigrants. The continuous influx of Muslim
immigrants not only adds to the size of the Muslim-
American community, but also creates new challenges
and opportunities. It is important not to approach
Muslim-Americans with a single ethnic- and religion-
driven template.
[Muslim-American] communities 
are not defined 
by their faith alone
4. Assist Community-Building Efforts
Our research suggests that building strong com-
munity institutions helps to prevent radicalization.
Strong communities can provide educational outreach
to Muslims who are uninformed about Islamic principles
opposing terrorism; they can identify those whose
lives have gone in the wrong direction and are in need
of assistance; and they can provide positive experiences
for youth. Many Muslim-American communities have
the resources to build community institutions without
assistance; others do not. We recommend that all
levels of government make additional efforts to offer
disadvantaged Muslim-American communities such
community-building resources as funding for recreation
centers, day care centers, public health clinics, and
courses in English as a Second Language. There is a
special need for these resources in isolated immigrant
communities.
We also recommend specific attention to one par-
ticular need for preventing violence: training to identify
signs of mental illness. Most of those who have radi-
calized and plotted or engaged in violence are perfectly
healthy, but there are some notable instances of Mus-
lim-Americans who were mentally ill and became
violent. A number of the respondents for this project
mentioned that the signs of mental illness were not
well understood in Muslim-American communities and
that it would be valuable to provide training to recognize
signs of mental illness.
5. Promote Outreach by Social Service 
Agencies
Muslim-American communities desire collaboration
and outreach with the government beyond law en-
forcement, in areas such as public health, education,
and transportation. Moving toward this type of en-
gagement acknowledges that Muslim-American com-
munities have needs and concerns in addition to con-
tributing to the nation’s counterterrorism efforts.
We recommend greater efforts by government
agencies at the federal and local level to direct resources
toward Muslim communities to improve public health,
education, and transportation. This kind of engagement
is viewed as an opportunity for Muslim-Americans to
become stakeholders in the general community. Recent
immigrants, for example, may not be familiar with
methods for accessing available social service resources.
We believe that general engagement in these areas
will contribute to counter-radicalization efforts by im-
proving community integration and reducing the
isolation of vulnerable populations. 
Specific issue areas that could be addressed through
education and other social services, with direct impli-
cations for the prevention of radicalization, include in-
ternet security (a major portal through which youth
may become radicalized), identifying and diagnosing
individuals with psychological and mental health issues,
and integrating former prisoners into the community.
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6. Support Enhanced Religious Literacy
This research confirmed what has been observed
in other studies of Muslim terrorists: most of those
who engage in religiously inspired terrorism have little
formal training in Islam and, in fact, are poorly educated
about Islam.112 At the same time, we have observed,
as have others, an increased religiosity among Muslim-
Americans. This is to be welcomed, not feared. Mus-
lim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious training
are far less likely to radicalize than those whose knowl-
edge of Islam is incomplete. 
However, our research found a paucity of intellectual
resources within the Muslim-American community to
deal with a range of theological issues linked to violence,
justice, and politics. Due to the levels of theological
literacy among the religious and lay leadership of Mus-
lim-American communities, Imams, leaders of community
organizations, and professionals within the community
were not always equipped to counter radical theologies
peddled by more politicized members of the community. 
It would not be appropriate for the government to
play a leading role in this area. The Muslim-American
community itself should invest in developing seminaries
and programs for its own leadership. On-line education
is a fairly inexpensive way to run courses that can be
offered to Muslim leaders across the country. Foundations
and universities may be willing to assist in the develop-
ment of courses that address theological issues to
assist in countering radical thought. Scholarship resources
should be made available for graduate and doctoral
work in these areas.
7. Increase Civil Rights Enforcement
There are already firmly institutionalized channels in
place for addressing societal discrimination. Enhanced
civil rights enforcement at local, state, and federal
levels will contribute toward addressing Muslim-American
concerns. 
*  *  *
In the eight years since the attacks of September
11, 2001, Muslim-Americans and government officials
have acted to prevent radicalization and build a positive
working relationship. Yet, there remains work to be
done. Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase
public safety, and create a positive social environment
for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in
good faith, we believe these goals are achievable.
Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase
public safety, and create a positive social environment
for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in
good faith, we believe these goals are achievable
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An offender is included in this database if all of the
following criteria are met:
1. the arrest or incident took place after September
11, 2001, and prior to the completion of this report
on January 1, 2010;
2. the offender is Muslim-American; and
3. the offender 
a. has been convicted on criminal charges for
terrorism-related activity that includes some
aspect of violence, which may consist of plan-
ning or directly supporting violence, or
b. has been arrested with a trial pending for ter-
rorism-related activity that includes some aspect
of violence, which may consist of planning or
directly supporting violence, or
c. is currently being pursued by law enforcement
for criminal activity according to public sources,
or
d. was killed during a terrorist incident. 
For criterion #2, individuals were considered to be
Muslim-American if they lived in the United States for
more than a year prior to the arrest, regardless of their
immigration status. Immigration status, if known, is re-
ported in the dataset. Offenders are only included if
the available evidence suggests that the offender
became radicalized while living inside the United States.
So, for example, an American citizen who spent most
of his/her life in Saudi Arabia and then committed a
terrorist offense would not be included in this dataset.
Offenders are included if they are identified as being
Muslim in public sources, or they described themselves
as being Muslim.  
For criteria #3a and #3b, offenders are included
based on the charges upon which they were tried and
convicted, or the official charges pending.  Inclusion
depends on the underlying conduct that constituted
the basis for the charge. So, for example, individuals
charged with material support for terrorism are included
in the dataset if the conduct includes any element of
violent activity, including attending a terrorist training
camp, receiving weapons training, or stockpiling
weapons. Individuals charged with material support
for terrorism where the underlying conduct was exclu-
sively the provision of financial support are not included.
Offenders who were killed during an incident are pre-






Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year of arrest 
or attack 
Official charges 












Age at time of 
arrest/attack 
Age at arrival 
in US 
Citizenship 
status 
Convert to 
Islam 
Ethnicity 
Om
er 
Ab
di 
Mo
ha
me
d 
20
09
 
Pr
ov
idi
ng
 m
ate
ria
l s
up
po
rt t
o a
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n a
nd
 co
ns
pir
ing
 to
 ki
ll, 
ma
im
, 
kid
na
p o
r in
jur
e p
eo
ple
 ou
tsi
de
 th
e U
nit
ed
 
St
ate
s 
Ch
arg
ed
, 
aw
ait
ing
 tri
al 
Le
ft M
inn
ea
po
lis
 fo
r S
om
ali
a; 
fou
gh
t w
ith
 S
ha
ba
ab
 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
Ye
s 
24
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
 
So
ma
li 
Ah
me
d A
li O
ma
r 
20
09
 
Pr
ov
idi
ng
 m
ate
ria
l s
up
po
rt t
o a
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n a
nd
 co
ns
pir
ing
 to
 ki
ll, 
ma
im
, 
kid
na
p o
r in
jur
e p
eo
ple
 ou
tsi
de
 th
e U
nit
ed
 
St
ate
s 
Ch
arg
ed
, a
t 
lar
ge
 
Le
ft M
inn
ea
po
lis
 fo
r S
om
ali
a; 
fou
gh
t w
ith
 S
ha
ba
ab
 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
Ye
s 
24
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
 
So
ma
li 
Ma
ha
mu
d S
aid
 O
ma
r 
20
09
 
Pr
ov
idi
ng
 m
ate
ria
l s
up
po
rt t
o a
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n  
Ch
arg
ed
, 
aw
ait
ing
 tri
al 
Re
cru
ite
d y
ou
ng
 S
om
ali
s i
n M
inn
ea
po
lis
 to
 jo
in 
Sh
ab
aa
b; 
pu
rch
as
ed
 w
ea
po
ns
 in
 S
om
ali
a f
or 
Mi
nn
ea
po
lis
 re
cru
its
 
US
 &
 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
43
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
Le
ga
l 
res
ide
nt 
No
 
So
ma
li 
Mu
sta
fa 
Sa
lat
 
20
09
 
Pr
ov
idi
ng
 m
ate
ria
l s
up
po
rt t
o a
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n a
nd
 co
ns
pir
ing
 to
 ki
ll, 
ma
im
, 
kid
na
p o
r in
jur
e p
eo
ple
 ou
tsi
de
 th
e U
nit
ed
 
St
ate
s 
Ch
arg
ed
, a
t 
lar
ge
 
Le
ft M
inn
ea
po
lis
 fo
r S
om
ali
a; 
fou
gh
t w
ith
 S
ha
ba
ab
 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
Ye
s 
19
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
No
 
So
ma
li 
Um
ar 
Ch
au
dh
ry 
20
09
 
No
ne
 
De
tai
ne
d b
y 
Pa
kis
tan
i 
au
tho
riti
es
 
Tr
av
ele
d t
o P
ak
ist
an
, a
lle
ge
dly
 to
 jo
in 
a f
ore
ign
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
24
 
4 
Na
tur
al-
ize
d 
cit
ize
n 
No
 
So
uth
 
As
ian
 
W
aq
ar 
Kh
an
 
20
09
 
No
ne
 
De
tai
ne
d b
y 
Pa
kis
tan
i 
au
tho
riti
es
 
Tr
av
ele
d t
o P
ak
ist
an
, a
lle
ge
dly
 to
 jo
in 
a f
ore
ign
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
22
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
Ci
tiz
en
 
No
 
So
uth
 
As
ian
 
Ah
ma
d A
. M
inn
i 
20
09
 
No
ne
 
De
tai
ne
d b
y 
Pa
kis
tan
i 
au
tho
riti
es
 
Tr
av
ele
d t
o P
ak
ist
an
, a
lle
ge
dly
 to
 jo
in 
a f
ore
ign
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
20
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
Na
tur
al-
ize
d 
cit
ize
n 
No
 
Er
itre
an
 
Am
an
 H
as
sa
n Y
em
er 
20
09
 
No
ne
 
De
tai
ne
d b
y 
Pa
kis
tan
i 
au
tho
riti
es
 
Tr
av
ele
d t
o P
ak
ist
an
, a
lle
ge
dly
 to
 jo
in 
a f
ore
ign
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
18
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
Na
tur
al-
ize
d 
cit
ize
n 
No
 
Et
hio
pia
n 
Ra
my
 Za
mz
am
 
20
09
 
No
ne
 
De
tai
ne
d b
y 
Pa
kis
tan
i 
au
tho
riti
es
 
Tr
av
ele
d t
o P
ak
ist
an
, a
lle
ge
dly
 to
 jo
in 
a f
ore
ign
 te
rro
ris
t 
org
an
iza
tio
n 
Ab
roa
d 
Ab
roa
d 
No
 
22
 
No
t 
kn
ow
n 
Ci
tiz
en
 
No
 
Ar
ab
 
 
